THE NEW REPUBLIC

A Journal of Opinion

VOL. III, NO. 3 NEW YORK, MONDAY, JULY 17, 1944 NUMBER 1546

Final Victory Is Nearer

Sunday, July 9, is a day that deserves to be remembered in the annals of this war. The Americans and British broke the German defenses at both ends of the line in Normandy, the Americans at La Haye du Puits and the British (and Canadians) at Caen. The Russians, plunging ahead in the Baltic area, pushed the Germans backward everywhere and got within 80 miles of East Prussia. Organized Japanese resistance ended on Saipan, which means that soon we can base our giant B-29's on airfields on that island only about four hours' flying time from Tokyo. In Italy, we captured Volterra and seemed on the point of taking Leghorn. In China, where the Japanese effort to cut the country in two appears definitely thwarted, the news was also good. Any one of these items would have been a sensation a year or so ago, when the Allies were still on the defensive. Now we take them in our stride.

Short of Gas?

Perhaps more important than any of these is the rising tide of evidence that the Germans are running desperately short of gasoline. German tanks and trucks have lately been found abandoned in good order, with empty gasoline tanks. The absence of the Luftwaffe from the sky can only be explained on this basis, since the Germans certainly have more planes and pilots than they are using, and they have sorely needed them during the past few weeks. This shortage of gasoline is due to our systematic air assaults.

Military experts are aware that the defeat of the Germans in Africa was caused primarily by the shortage of gasoline. British planes concentrated on bombing tankers crossing the Mediterranean, and got so many of them that Rommel's army could no longer function. Airfields were captured with rows of German planes sitting on them, in perfect condition. The Germans not only lacked gasoline to fly them; they didn't even have enough to sprinkle over them and set them on fire. It looks as though the shortage of gasoline in Germany itself were reaching most serious proportions.

The Vice President Comes Home

We don't know how it struck anyone else, but we found Vice President Wallace's report to the people on his trip to Russia and China a thrilling document. His vision of a future in which the United States cooperates with the North Pacific and East Asia to help solve the problems of those regions and build a basis for permanent peace and prosperity seemed to us to combine the practical and the ideal, the prosaic and the imaginative, in just exactly the right amounts. When he said that China must reconstruct her agriculture and that science should work on the problem of the permanently frozen land of the Far North, he spoke as no other man in public life could have done, for he is an outstanding expert on the application of scientific principles to agrarian problems. No one who knows how firmly he is rooted in our traditions needed to be told that he would come back "more than ever an American," more than ever convinced that "the American way of life is the best way of life." Mr. Wallace said "it was a wonderful trip," and he sounds as though this came from the heart. His closing words deserve to sink home:

We want a higher standard of living in America. We want full production, jobs for our boys who come home,

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PUBLISHED WEEKLY AND COPYRIGHT, 1944, IN THE U.S.A. BY EDITORIAL PUBLICATIONS, INC., 40 EAST 49 ST., NEW YORK 17, N. Y.
ENTERED AS SECOND-CLASS MATTER, NOVEMBER 6, 1914, AT THE POST OFFICE AT NEW YORK, N. Y., UNDER THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1879
PRINTED IN THE U.S.A.

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and peacetime jobs for those who are now employed. Trade with Russia and China will help keep the factories of America busy in the days which lie ahead. We are on our way.

Robot Bombs and Air Power

Mr. Churchill, reporting to the House of Commons on the robot bombs, employed that frankness which is always the chief safeguard of democracy. He admitted that they had caused many casualties, especially in London, and gave no promises that anything better was in store. Whether it is worth while to the Germans to go to such trouble and expense to kill civilians at the rate of one per bomb, however, must seem dubious after his revelation of the figures. If the British could live through the blitz and go on fighting when Hitler seemed to have the war almost won, nobody can doubt that they will be undeflected from their course at this stage of affairs, as Churchill promised. The Germans are diverting some Allied air power, but at the same time they are solidifying British resolution to keep them severely in check in the future.

Incidentally, the bombardment is proof, if any were needed, that air power alone cannot win a war. Allied planes have been intensively bombing the launching platforms and the Pas de Calais area as a whole for months; they have redoubled their efforts since the new weapon was first employed. Doubtless the plague would have been worse if they had not done so, but if air power were all its extreme supporters claim, not a launching installation would be left by now.

Bombing the Pas de Calais

The Allied planes at first were able to do great damage by hitting the rails on which the robot bombs are launched. The Germans soon learned, however, to prefabricate these rails, so that a smashed-up section could quickly be replaced. They also built a low concrete wall on either side of the rails themselves, parallel with them, and a bomb from an airplane which falls outside these walls does little damage. To hit between them is almost impossible.

The heart of the robot bomb is the gyroscopic automatic pilot, a delicate and complicated machine. It is not installed until the last minute, and even with highly skilled men working as fast as possible, it takes forty minutes, so that each launching platform can fire only 36 missiles per day. The Allied bombers now concentrate on seeking to destroy the storehouses where the automatic pilots are kept before use. On July 8, they made a lucky hit on a large amount of robot-bomb supplies in a series of natural caves near Paris.

While bombing the materials and the roads and railways leading to the launching platforms is of course better than nothing, it is not an effective answer to this savage device, which is so inaccurate that it only commits murder at random. Morally, its use is on a degraded level which the Allies would reach if they were to send thousands of boxes of poisoned candy through the mail to householders all over Germany, with some sort of guarantee that it would be eaten.

FDR Abroad Again?

The report that the President might go to the Normandy battlefront for a consultation with other war leaders, and that he might address this country by radio while there, has caused intense apprehension to Mr. Dewey. The Republican candidate is not afraid that anything will happen to Mr. Roosevelt—far from it—but he does fear that his opponent may win some votes. The delicacies of sportsmanship in an American presidential campaign, especially when the country is at war, appear to be rather intricate.

Nobody can possibly expect that the President, speaking from Normandy in these critical days, will waste his time by a campaign harangue attacking his domestic political foes. But it is quite conceivable that as the leader of a nation at war he may say something that will add to his eminence and popularity. To suggest that if this happens he will be guilty of unsportsmanlike conduct seems hardly worthy of an aspirant for his place who is mature enough for the job.

As long as Mr. Roosevelt is in office he is the President of the Republicans and Mr. Dewey as well as of all the rest of us. Anything he has to say should be welcomed and listened to with respect; if for reasons of state we do not like it, any of us may and should say so, but to object to his playing his appointed role in this crisis of history just because somebody else wants his job is, to say the least, juvenile.

German Savagery

As final defeat comes nearer, the savagery of the Germans becomes worse than ever, if that is possible. They continue to kill Jews from Hungary and other parts of Europe, wholesale. Cases are being recorded where, other methods being too slow and expensive, victims were simply buried alive by the score, and dirt shoveled over them. Both in Greece and in France there have lately been repetitions of Lidice. The entire populations of the Greek village of Distomo and the French village Oradour-sur-Glane have been slaughtered in revenge for guerrilla activities. In Greece, the inhabitants were lined up and machine-gunned to death. In France, many people who had taken refuge in a church were locked in and burned to death.

It is obvious that this is pathological behavior, which bears no relation to the acts of normal, civilized human beings.The fact that the Germans behave this way when they know they are soon certain to lose the war, makes it seem all the less like rational action. It is clear that there are many thousands of people in Germany who cannot under any circumstances be treated

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like normal human beings. What to do with them is a problem which will tax the intelligence of Allied leaders to the utmost.

Army Censorship

The army is at present suffering under a perfectly ridiculous political censorship recently imposed upon it by Congress. It is forbidden to circulate among the troops anything that can be interpreted as political propaganda. This has led to such idiotic actions as suppressing the army edition of Charles A. Beard's book, "The Republic," and others equally innocent. Now, it is also being extended to army newspapers. Colonel Egbert White, Director of the Mediterranean editions of The Stars and Stripes, has been relieved of his post because he sensibly insisted that American soldiers are also American citizens and entitled to know what is happening in this country, including political news. It seems pretty clear that the muzzling of the army newspapers in the Mediterranean area goes far beyond the requirements of the law; soldiers are being allowed to vote, at least in theory, and it is nonsensical to say that they must be kept in the dark about issues and candidates. But the stupid law recently passed gives stupid brass hats an opportunity for censorship they would not otherwise have. It should be repealed the moment Congress reconvenes.

North Dakota Primary

Whether Senator Gerald P. Nye won his fight for renomination in the Republican primary in North Dakota will not be known until the end of the month. State officials have extended until then the time allowed for soldier ballots to be counted. Although a majority of the soldiers are said to be against Nye, who is a notorious isolationist and appeaser, independent political observers in North Dakota don't believe the soldier ballots will overcome Nye's lead of a few hundred votes in about 100,000.

If the Senator's two opponents, Representative Usher L. Burdick and Lynn Stambaugh, had been able to come to an understanding in advance, Nye would have been overwhelmingly defeated, since he got only about one-third of the votes. Burdick and Stambaugh, however, are too far apart politically to make this possible. Nye owes his victory to an unprecedented rainstorm which turned rural roads into mud and made it impossible for many anti-Nye farmers to get to the polling places.

Nye never replied to the criticisms made of him. He campaigned exclusively by identifying the CIO with communism, and painted horrendous pictures of what would become of North Dakota if Burdick, who had the support of labor locally, were elected. Stambaugh used the same argument as Nye. Burdick's campaign managers were cautious, perhaps too cautious, about Nye's isolationism. William Green of the AFL disgraced himself by endorsing Nye, and so did Labor, the national newspaper of the Railroad Brotherhoods.

Nye's troubles are not over, even if it is found that he won the primary. Either Burdick or Stambaugh can file again and run as an independent in the November election. Either of them could quite possibly take enough votes from Nye to swing the victory to the Democratic candidate, the conservative Governor Moses.

Against Clark of Missouri

Liberal Democrats in Missouri can live up to their beliefs by voting against United States Senator Bennett Champ Clark in the primary on August 1. His opponent, Missouri Attorney General Roy McKittrick, seems to us superior to him in every way. Clark has a bad record both on domestic and foreign issues. He was an isolationist and America Firster; a darling of Pelley's Roll Call, Gerald Winrod's Defender, the Bund's Deutscher Weckruf, Scribner's Commentator and the Voelkischer Beobachter of Berlin. He voted against lend-lease and to keep our army in this hemisphere, and he would have disbanded the army after eighteen months' training. He opposed revision of the Neutrality Act. He is a Red-baiter and one of the authors of the outrageous "inquiry" into "Hollywood warmongering." Clark was against UNRRA, the National Resources Planning Board, soil conservation, the Farm Security Administration and the Fair Employment Practice Committee. He voted against some of the measures needed to fight inflation, and he opposed the President on the veto of the totally inadequate tax bill. In The New Republic's most recent chart, he had only seven progressive votes out of eighteen. He is closely connected with utility and railroad interests. His permanent retirement to private life is devoutly to be desired.

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. . . But the Guy Is Bulletproof

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Keep Vice President Wallace!

REPORTS FROM WASHINGTON say that the campaign to prevent the renomination of Henry A. Wallace as Vice President has now reached the fever stage. Alternative candidates are being brought forward from day to day and from edition to edition. Senator Truman, Mr. Justice Douglas and Messrs. Rayburn, George, Byrnes, Barkley, Byrd, Tydings, Overton, Connally, Minton and others have all been mentioned. One Washington reporter says a subtle part of the campaign against Mr. Wallace is to go to various important supporters of his and offer each of them, secretly and separately, the vice-presidential nomination. The theory is that the appeal to each man's personal vanity will be irresistible.

What is the objection to another term for Mr. Wallace? There are three. First, he is incorruptible and unreachable; he will not take orders from any political machine. Second, he is a New Dealer, the chief one of any importance in Washington who still voices the aspirations of the plain people of this country for a better world. Third, he is considered not to be a practical executive, although he ran a magazine well, was a successful practical scientist in the field of genetics, ran the Department of Agriculture well, ran the Bureau of Economic Warfare well, has presided over the Senate well, made an outstanding success in Latin America when beset on all sides by opportunities for grave blunders, and has apparently done an extremely good job in Russia and China. With the possible exception of Douglas, nobody else who has been mentioned for the vice-presidency approaches Wallace in stature.

What is the President's attitude? He wants Mr. Wallace again, and has said so repeatedly. Just how firmly he is prepared to fight for him is not yet certain. What is certain is that unless the President does fight, the politicians will get their way, and will give the second place to a pliant compromiser of their own undistinguished variety.

The argument the professional politicians use is that the party must not be disrupted, that the Southern conservatives might plot against the President in the Electoral College, that nobody wants Wallace except labor and the liberals, who will have to vote for Mr. Roosevelt anyhow, since they cannot possibly vote for Dewey, and that their feelings about Wallace must not be weighed in the scale against the desirability of party harmony.

The same argument is being used, according to press reports, to justify a "white-supremacy" Democratic platform, such as the Southern conservatives want. The argument is that the President can always keep the Northern Negroes in line, or if he cannot, that they are not worth bothering with, compared with the necessity of holding the Southern tories.

To those who argue that the President does not need to appease the Northern liberals, one may reply with equal logic that he doesn't need to appease the Southern conservatives. There is every evidence that at least 70 or 80 percent of the voters in the South are in favor of a fourth term for FDR. If they stay in this frame of mind, any talk of a revolt in the Electoral College to throw the election into the House of Representatives becomes the sheerest nonsense. Any elector who betrayed 70 percent of the people of his state in the Electoral College would never dare go home again. He would be ostracized if not lynched by his indignant neighbors. The only thing the revolting Southern conservatives can do is to stay home and sulk. The South will not go Republican whatever happens. President Roosevelt has very little need to placate these Southern Republocrats, so far as the election is concerned.

Does he need to placate anybody in the North? One remembers that protagonists for special groups always exaggerate their importance; and with due allowance for this factor, it is fair to say that it is of the highest importance that Mr. Roosevelt get a large vote among the people who will be most disheartened if Mr. Wallace is cast aside. Obviously, the President needs to carry Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, or most of them, if he is to win. In those states public-opinion polls and other evidences indicate that the vote between the two parties will be close. Independent liberals and trade-union members, between them, can certainly tip the scales one way or the other in several of these states. There is little danger, certainly, that liberals or labor will vote for Dewey; but there is a real danger that a substantial portion of them might stay home on election day.

Let it not be forgotten that these groups now have a fairly impressive list of grievances against the Roosevelt administration. Both liberals and labor object to most of its foreign policy and especially the past policy toward France, Italy and Spain. As to the plans for future world organization, the Republicans and Democrats have now endorsed almost the same ideas in almost the same words. Both liberals and labor object to the reconversion policy of the Baruch-Hancock report. Both object to the great tenderness with which large corporations have been treated during the war effort. Labor wants the wage ceiling boosted; labor and liberals both want inflation resisted better than has been done. Not all these things are Mr. Roosevelt's fault; but in an election year, he has to be judged by the record of his administration as a whole. To both liberals and labor, the presence of Henry Wallace in the Cabinet has been like a white stone marking our possible way out of the forest when the war is over. To discard him now will make the future seem disproportionately darker.

The same general argument applies to the Negro

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vote in the North, which will certainly be lost in large part if the Democratic convention appeases the Southern Republocrats. Earl Brown, an intelligent Negro journalist, points out in the current Harper's that there are 2,000,000 Northern Negro votes; that they started returning to the Republican Party in 1940 and had done so pretty completely in '42. Mr. Brown says that Harlem went Republican and helped give Dewey the victory in the last New York State election. He says the Negroes brought a Republican victory in the Twenty-first Congressional District, New York City, last February and in the Pennsylvania Second Congressional District last March. He says they went Republican in Kentucky in 1943 and are Republican today in New Jersey, Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri and West Virginia. They hold the balance of power, in his opinion, in eight states—New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Ohio, New Jersey, Indiana, Michigan and Missouri.

The Northern Negroes have three great grievances: discrimination against Negro soldiers in the army, race riots, and the failure to give any real power to the Fair Employment Practice Committee. They also have grievances against Dewey, and were probably not taken in by the fair words of the Republican platform, so much fairer than the actions of the Republicans in Congress. The danger is not perhaps that a majority of them will vote for Dewey, but that a large proportion of those who would otherwise have voted for Roosevelt will stay at home.

The President of course must make his own decision. We hope, however, that as he does so he will remember two things. First, when morality and expediency both point in the same direction, it is foolish to insist on looking elsewhere. Second, we hope the President will recall not merely this year's election, but his place in history. The next will be his last term in office—if he wins. Now more than ever he should consider his actions in the light of his repeatedly avowed policies and principles.

Bretton Trees and Forest

THERE IS A DANGER that the reporters of the Bretton Woods conference, and some of the delegates too, for that matter, will pay so much attention to the trees that they will fail to see the forest. We read that there are disputes about the method of fixing the quotas of contribution for the various countries, quotas which determine the voting power of these countries and lay the basis for limitations on their drawing power. We hear that some nations want these limitations set higher than others do. Such matters, however technically important, are the grist of any conference setting up a new project, and it is inconceivable that the project itself should be endangered by failure to agree about matters like this, as long as the importance of the main objective is understood.

The real menace comes from those who oppose any international machinery at all for the stabilization of currencies, so long as it differs in any essential respect from the old international gold standard. These forces find their strength mainly in the United States, not among the delegates, except in so far as they are influenced by public opinion in this country, but among bankers, conservative economists and the politicians and journalists who reflect their point of view.

Take for instance the objection heard in the United States, that our contribution to the fund, consisting largely of gold and dollars of unassailable value, will be used to buy weak currencies which in the end are likely to depreciate, and thus the money will be "poured down a rat hole." If any attempt at maintaining exchange stability is to be made, what other possible device is there than to buy weak currencies with strong ones or with gold? If there were no stabilization plan at all, and if, as this argument assumes, some currencies will continue to be weak in relation to the dollar, they would depreciate all the more quickly, and there would still be no exchange stability. No plan whatever, including the automatic gold standard, offers any protection against such eventualities, so long as we assume that there continues to be a much larger demand for dollars than for other currencies.

All such arguments appear in their true light when it is admitted—as it is admitted by all concerned—that the exchange-stabilization plan in itself is useful merely for short-run variations, and for introducing some measure of elasticity pending the application of more fundamental remedies. The opponents of the plan fear that it will be used as a substitute for the fundamental remedies they favor. They need not fear, for two very good reasons: first, it cannot be so used for very long, especially in view of the moderate size of the fund in proportion to the volume of international payments; second, and more important, the chief remedy they wish to apply will not be applied in any circumstances, whether there is a stabilization fund or a rigid gold standard or any other conceivable money plan whatever.

What is this remedy? They usually speak of it in euphemistic terms, like "sound" fiscal policy on the part of the country whose currency is tending to depreciate. But its true and ugly name is deflation, with depression and unemployment. According to this theory, the economic rulers of each nation should guide their internal policy by the stability or instability of their foreign exchange. When they see exchange rates dropping, they should raise their interest rates, restrict credit and force internal prices to fall. Then trade may revive at the lower price level, more goods will be exported, and consequently the increased demand for the country's currency in the exchange markets will restore its value.

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It sounds very neat, but those who must undergo monetary losses, privation or even hunger during the process do not place a high value on this sort of tidiness. Moreover, the economic history of recent years proves that it frequently does not work even if it is voluntarily or involuntarily tried. Deflation has a way of seeking new bottoms, and trade does not necessarily respond to changed interest rates or even to new levels of prices. What happens in nine out of ten cases in these circumstances is that the nation in question throws the gold standard to the winds, devalues its currency, introduces governmental exchange controls, barter agreements and the like, and does its best to insulate itself against the world economy which has carried deflation to its shores.

All this happened before the war, with unfortunate repercussions on world trade, and there is no surer way to make it happen again after the war than to kill international exchange stabilization and rely again on the gold standard. The American objectors are perfectly willing to have an international agreement for exchange stabilization, provided it is completely rigid and all countries promise in advance to adopt "sound" internal policies if their currencies start to slide. This would be worse for the countries in question than the old gold standard itself. The debtor countries will never agree to live in such a prison. In particular, Great Britain will never agree to it. They would rather take their chances without any American coöperation. If this is all we offer, they will choose imperial preference, a renewal of the "sterling block" and cutthroat competition against the United States for world trade.

The only real remedy is the one proposed by the advocates of exchange stabilization—an expanding world economy, in which a continual increase of production and consumption wipes out deflationary tendencies everywhere. Opponents of this remedy, with their eyes directed to the supposed virtues of deflation, persist in regarding it as inflation. They do so simply because it involves easy money and the use of governmental funds when the private sector of the economy shows signs of lagging. But inflation is the increase of money in circulation without a corresponding increase in the quantity of goods produced and distributed. That is the reason it brings soaring prices. The advocates of a compensatory fiscal policy believe no more in inflation than they believe in deflation. They want an increase of purchasing power, to be sure, when business lags, but only for the purpose of increasing production and employment by equal or greater measure. The productive capacity of the industrial nations has been proved so great during the war that the chief postwar problem appears to be to ensure a sufficient flow of purchasing power in order to stimulate it.

On the international field, the agency which is planned to apply this remedy is the international bank, also to be considered at Bretton Woods. This is the essential twin of the stabilization plan. When currencies show a long-term weakness, reflecting lack of demand for them, the real remedy is not deflation in most cases, but increase of productive power and hence of the export balances of the countries in question. Whether these countries make more of what they have formerly imported, or make more goods for export, or both at once, the effect on their exchange will be permanent improvement. In an expanding economy, they can do both at once, and without injury to anyone else. Reduced tariffs and the removal of other trade barriers are also important, but these reforms facilitate trade rather than initiating it, and follow rather than precede the correction of more fundamental maladjustments.

Transfer of funds from the United States for productive investment in a "backward" region will put our gold to work, increase our exports of capital goods and our employment, help to stabilize exchanges, and assist in providing a permanent remedy for the excess demand for dollars which causes the exchange difficulty. This remedy is, moreover, acceptable to the countries in question in a way which deflation is not. It is not intended, of course, that all such foreign investment must be made out of public funds and channeled through the international bank. But many investments in public improvements, necessary to get the program started, are not suitable for private investment because of their size, the low interest rates which will be necessary and the long waits for repayment which will be inevitable. The real answer to most of the basic objections to the stabilization fund is to compare the inevitable results of deflation, which the objectors want, with those of an expanding world economy, which the proponents of the new institutions want. The rest of the nations have for the most part already made their choice. If we do not go along, they will do as best they can without us, but they will not go our way again. We shall merely isolate ourselves.

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Advertising Manager: E. G. WOOD

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Letter to Wendell Willkie

DEAR MR. WILLKIE: You have established for yourself, to use your own expression, a "reservoir of good will" among the American people. That reservoir may be the decisive factor in this first wartime general election since the Civil War.

You must certainly agree that the issues confronting the American people in this election are of more than ordinary significance. The record of your activities during these past few years has convinced most liberals that you share their conviction that this is no time for "politics as usual." For millions of Americans, Democrats and Republicans alike, you have become the symbol, not only of the international viewpoint, but of a responsible independence in political affairs.

Undoubtedly you do not share all the political and economic convictions of the majority of American liberals, nor do they agree completely with your expressed point of view on all matters. But it does appear that the essential issues of this election tend to make you the political ally of the progressives rather than their opponent. Most non-doctrinaire liberals are completely non-partisan as between the major parties but strictly partisan in terms of issues. And they are convinced that unless the American people vote for issues rather than parties this coming November, the results may make a mockery of the sacrifices of this war.

Unfortunately, in American political history party platforms have rarely been accurate guides for intelligent voting because parties have almost always promised more than they had any intention of delivering. But the platform adopted *unanimously* by the recent Republican convention, even in its wildest promises, offers far less than is essential for a lasting peace and a stable America. Mr. Walter Lippmann has termed this platform "as reckless and as mischievous as irresponsible politicians dared to make it." In a most laudable effort to forestall the formulation of just such a platform, you submitted your own views in seven thoughtful articles reprinted by the entire press. Not only were your views scorned, but you personally, and consequently your popular following in the Republican Party, were so completely disregarded that the name of the 1940 Republican presidential candidate, who received more votes than any other Republican candidate in the history of the party, was not once mentioned at the 1944 Republican National Convention.

How did the Republican policy-makers answer the plea for a responsible platform which you made in your seven articles?

You insisted that "a strong central government is necessary to prevent disruption of our economic and social structure by a variety of conflicting authorities and interests." The Republican Party talked of "avoid[ing] federalization of government activities," scorned "the panacea of federal cash," clearly implied that the administration was using "either the communistic or the fascist technique."

While the most progressive planks in the Republican platform concerned the rights of the Negro, there was still great discrepancy between your program and that of your party. You agreed with the Negro community in refusing "to accept the technical arguments against cloture in the debates on anti-poll-tax and anti-lynching bills, or even the sincere claims of constitutionalism which prevent such just measures from becoming law." The Republican Party, many of whose Senators had voted against cloture, failed to include the anti-poll-tax bill in its platform, but contented itself with favoring a constitutional amendment which most commentators agree is impossible of passage.

While you advocated "an adequate and uniform system of federal unemployment insurance," the Republican Party, whose legislative record is one of opposition to federal social security, stressed the state programs in their security plank. While you forthrightly urged "complete medical care . . . available to all," the Republican platform warned against "socializing medicine."

Confronting the crucial problem of postwar employment, you courageously and realistically insisted that "the Republican Party cannot meet the need of the postwar period by merely passing resolutions in favor of 'free enterprise'." The Republican convention answered you by saying that "we shall promote the fullest employment through private enterprise." You recognized that "it is going to be impossible to have any early general reduction of taxes when the war is over," but the party demanded that "as soon as the war ends the present rate of taxation . . . should be reduced as far as is consistent with the payment of the normal expenditures of government in the postwar period." While you urged that "the federal government must exercise a counter-cyclical influence against depression in order to preserve a reasonably high level of employment," the Republican convention promised only to "take government out of competition with private industry and terminate rationing, price-fixing and all other emergency powers."

In your fifth article, on labor, you gave full recognition to the changed status of American labor and generously acknowledged that the present administration "has taken cognizance of this historic change." You boldly advocated the repeal of "coercive legislation such as the Smith-Connally Act," supported labor's constructive demands for "an annual wage to those who work in plants with long seasonal or periodic shut-

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downs" and praised by name the responsible public statements of R. J. Thomas and David Dubinsky. The Republican platform-makers failed to accept your suggestions on any of these points, but under the guidance of reactionary William Hutcheson and advisers of John L. Lewis wrote a plank which, for sheer demagogy, is almost unequaled in the annals of political platforms. The very men who shouted to the housetops because the President made grudging concessions in an effort to make peace with the United Mine Workers now "condemn the freezing of wage rates at arbitrary levels."

In your article on international trade, you urge a "revision of our tariff" and that "through the United Nations Council an attempt should be made to reach general agreement on a clear and uniform code for international economic relations." The party platform promised to "establish and maintain a fair protective tariff on competitive products" and accepted modification of such tariffs "only by reciprocal bilateral trade agreements approved by Congress." There is, it need hardly be pointed out, an immense difference between your "general agreement" and the party's "bilateral agreements."

Your final article concerned foreign policy. With few exceptions, American liberals share your vigorous criticism of the administration's expediency policy. We agree with your forthright condemnation of our dealing with Fascist elements in conquered countries and of our refusal to recognize the French Committee of National Liberation as the Provisional French Government. We agree particularly with your clear and moving insistence that "Mr. Churchill to the contrary, the ideologies for which we fight have not become blurred for us in the course of the fighting but have become clearer every day; and that, Mr. Roosevelt to the contrary, in becoming wiser we have not become more cynical." But, whatever our skepticism about certain present trends in foreign policy, we cannot be persuaded that the Republican Party offers a more promising alternative. Indeed, your own sharp criticisms of the foreign-policy plank in the Republican platform, sent to the convention on June 26 and completely rejected by the platform-makers there, require no further commentary. As you so eloquently wrote, "The net result would be no international organization. No effective international force for the suppression of aggression. No peaceful world. Another world war fought in vain. And the youth of America once more betrayed." Given the present situation and the unquestionably preferable record of the administration's congressional spokesmen in international affairs, we believe that our only chance of obtaining a decent peace lies in a united, non-partisan, popular pressure to compel a more liberal foreign policy by the present administration. It might even be pointed out that the most extreme anti-administration columnists, including Arthur Krock and Mark Sullivan, defend those very State Department policies to which you and we are vigorously opposed.

This platform is Dewey's. If he did not guide its writing, it was his responsibility to have done so. So that there might be no misunderstanding on this point, the platform contains, "as a matter of private honor and public faith," the unprecedented "undertaking by each candidate to be true to the principles and program herein set forth." Furthermore, the convention's insult to the 1940 Republican nominee was Governor Dewey's insult. Having full control of the New York State delegation, it was Dewey who violated all traditions by not even making it possible for you to attend the convention as a delegate-at-large.

If the Republican platform is an invitation to a disorganized world and economic chaos at home, the Republican presidential nominee has done nothing since his selection by the convention to give confidence to progressive Americans. He enthusiastically accepted as his running-mate the hero and the symbol of the extreme nationalists; Governor Bricker was not only the first choice of Gerald L. K. Smith but the popular hero of the convention delegates. Subsequently, Governor Dewey made even greater concessions to the Old Guard extremists by appointing Harrison Spangler as counsel to the Republican National Committee and Werner Schroeder, spokesman for Colonel Robert McCormick, as the committee's vice-chairman.

The Republican program and Governor Dewey's appointments are, it must be admitted, not inconsistent with the recent record of the majority of Republican legislators in Congress. Liberals would call to your attention that a victory for Governor Dewey in November will mean the certain reëlection of such men as Representatives Hamilton Fish Jr., Harold Knutson, Stephen Day and many others, and the probable defeat of Senator Lucas of Illinois by the Chicago Tribune candidate, Richard Lyons, and of Senator Wagner of New York, whose progressive record is unparalleled in the Senate. A Dewey victory will mean Republican control of the House, with Representative Fish becoming chairman of the Rules Committee, Representative Tabor of the Appropriations Committee, Representative Wolcott of the Banking and Currency Committee, Representative Treadway of the Ways and Means Committee, Representative Andrews of the Military Affairs Committee and Representative Maas of the Naval Affairs Committee. By no stretch of the imagination could such a result be conducive to the principles which you have enunciated.

Mr. Willkie, liberals share your criticism of great sections of the Democratic Party. We have no more sympathy than you have for the Southern Bourbons, for the racists like Representatives Rankin and Cox, or Senators Bilbo and O'Daniel. Nor do we have any more confidence than do you in the corrupt Northern

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machines symbolized by Mayor Hague of Jersey City.

But politics, as you are certainly aware, is the science of alternatives. And progressives are convinced that of the two alternatives that will be presented to the electorate this fall, the reëlection of the present administration offers the best hope for America in the next fateful years.

Politically realistic liberals recognize the difficulty of your position in regard to the presidential race itself. But they would remind you that one of the great perils to American democracy in the next few years lies in the election of a Congress so reactionary and embittered that a partisan fight between the legislative and the executive branches of our government will take precedence over the solution of those problems, national and international, which will face a victorious but war-weary country.

In all probability this general election, and particularly the congressional elections, will be decided by the independent voters of America. In this fact lies your great personal responsibility and your opportunity. It is perhaps not too much to say that the most decisive choice of all will be your own. Fully recognizing the unprecedented character of the decision you must make, liberals nevertheless hold that this is an unprecedented election. They therefore look to you, Mr. Willkie, to take the leadership in organizing the independent voters of America for the election to Congress of progressive candidates, regardless of party affiliation. Such a declaration of political independence by you would lend immeasurable weight to the present efforts of independent forces throughout the country.

If you should decide that party loyalty is paramount, you will lend respectability to the façade behind which Colonel McCormick, Gerald L. K. Smith and Mr. Hearst are making their bid for political power. If by your activity or your tacit endorsement you encourage, directly or indirectly, the election of men pledged to the Republican platform, you will disillusion millions of politically independent Americans who have valued your responsible espousal of principles which can give meaning to this war. And you will be repeating, with the same disastrous result, the tragic error of the 31 leading Republicans of 1920 who, in your own words, "assured the American electorate that a Republican victory was the surest road to an effective world organization."

If, however, you are convinced that the issues facing the American people are more important than any party, if you decide that the sacrifices being made in this war warrant at least the sacrifice of mere party loyalty, if you determine to participate actively in the campaign in behalf of your convictions, you will raise the political level of the entire campaign; you will give heart to millions of Americans who believe that this is no time for "politics as usual," and you will be performing a service to your country for which future generations will be in your debt.

Most respectfully yours,

New York City JAMES LOEB JR.

A Reporter at Bretton Woods

IT IS a time-honored and innocent custom for newspapermen to assume an amused indifference to their assignment of the day. The United Nations monetary conference here at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, is ideal for this attitude, heavy as it is with the confusing statistical trappings of professional economists in rimless eyeglasses. But somehow the feeling has permeated the lobby and the barroom of the Mt. Washington Hotel that these men of 44 nations, who have a universal and baffling language of their own, are dealing with meat and potatoes, with flesh and blood, with a daring attempt to prove that mankind need not necessarily make instruments of war to attain full employment.

Perhaps this feeling was started on its way by President Roosevelt's letter of greeting, in which he reminded the delegates of what they already know, that economic diseases are highly communicable; no doubt Secretary Morgenthau helped when he uttered an economic axiom no less powerful because of repetition, that prosperity, like peace, is indivisible. At any rate; it seems reasonable to assume that if the delegates complete their work in amity, the congressional members of the American delegation, Senators Tobey and Wagner and Representatives Wolcott, Somers and Reed, will return to their brethren in Washington with a sober and convincing argument that Congress dare not kick over the work done here with epithets about "Uncle Sap."

What then are these noble endeavors at Bretton Woods, about which I seem to wax hysterical?

The delegates are here to make a formal draft of a plan already adumbrated by United Nations monetary technicians in conferences extending over many months. Briefly, they will present two blueprints, one for a bank to put the world on its feet after the war, and the other for an $8 billion currency-stabilization fund to keep said world on its feet. The Bretton Woods proposals, to become effective, must later be enacted into law by the participating governments. Our own Congress, if it turns a deaf ear to its representatives here and acts upon its traditional fear and suspicion of foreign nations, can kill American participation in the bank and in the fund. The whole plan will then be bread without salt.

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The Bank for Reconstruction and Development would make loans to devastated countries to restore their economies and replace the instruments of production. In the words of Lord Keynes, chairman of the British delegation, the subsequent job of the bank, after its reconstruction work, will be "to develop the resources and productive capacity of the world, with special attention to the less developed countries, to raise the standard of life and conditions of labor everywhere, to make the resources of the world more fully available to all mankind, and so to order its operations as to promote and maintain equilibrium in the international balances of payments of all member countries."

(Since there is a great emphasis here on improving the standards of life and labor, it is remarkable that there is not a labor man on the property. Perhaps the many bankers present have an allergy for them. At any rate, organized labor was consulted in the discussions leading up to the conference.)

Without belittling the proposal for an international bank, or RFC, which is the subject of a conference commission headed by Lord Keynes, it seems to be dwarfed in importance by the proposed currency-stabilization fund, the terms of which are being worked out by a commission headed by Harry D. White, assistant Secretary of the Treasury and one of the moving spirits behind this whole conference.

The news of this fund is somewhat cloudy with technical details of quota assignments and other aspects, but the whole aspiration of the proposal and of this meeting is contained in the opening statement of the agenda of White's commission. The stabilization fund would "facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade and contribute in this way to the maintenance of a high level of employment and real income." It is intended "to give confidence to member countries by making the fund's resources available to them under adequate safeguards, thus giving members time to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments *without resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity.*"

The whole future of this brave plan is based on the hope that the economic nationalists in this country will not succeed in building another Chinese Wall; that the barriers against international trade will be lowered; that enlightened trade policies will remove the temptation from a nation faced with economic instability to resort to unilateral, selfish and temporarily advantageous manipulation of its own currency in the foreign-exchange market.

The fund would be a permanently fixed bag of currency and gold. Proportions of different national currencies in the fund will vary from time to time, but the total would be the same $8 billion at the beginning, and possibly $10 billion later, when and if a reconstructed Germany and her satellites should come into the fund.

In our daily "seminars" with Harry White, the fact is drummed home that this fund in itself, without a proper trade policy, will not work, that we cannot say to the world that we will sell to them but not buy from them, and expect an even prosperity and peace. The assumption is not warranted, one gathers, that the United States will always be in a position to sell more than it buys. If we try to operate on that assumption, we shall again run into a world of restrictive quota systems, multiple currencies and competitive depreciation. If we are to maintain a national income of $150 billion after this war (and such a sum will be necessary to service our national debt), we shall have to export at least $10 billion worth of goods annually. This is more than three times our average annual foreign exports for the five years prior to the present war. Exports of that magnitude will have to be paid for in goods, since we have already a large share of the world's gold; hence the impelling necessity for this $8 billion pot of foreign exchange into which the participating nations can dip to support their currencies in periods of stress, to keep within a narrow range the fluctuations of foreign exchange, to assure business men that they will receive payment for goods at the rate for which they contracted—in short, to keep open the channels of expanding trade and to that extent assure expanding employment opportunities.

Critical questions are thrown at Harry White at the afternoon seminars for the press, in a side room of the hotel. He has used the words "proper purposes" in connection with a participating nation's borrowing from the fund. Will the fund, someone asks, have the right to dictate the internal policies of a participating nation? No, says White. But if a nation comes to the fund for money for the "wrong purpose" (such as to help a flight of its own capital), the fund won't do business with it. If the country is buying imports over its head, the fund can tell it to pull in its belt for a few years. If it is a one or two-crop nation, and failure of these crops precipitates a crisis, the nation will get help beyond its quota, depending upon its needs.

Another criticism, which will be heard in Congress, is that "Uncle Sap" is pouring money down a rathole; that the dollars in the fund will soon be replaced with the currencies of other nations which have drained out the dollars with their foreign-exchange loans and purchases. Harry White answers this with seeming simplicity. The foreign currencies in the fund will be our own foreign exchange, our future purchasing power, even as the gold in Fort Knox is our purchasing power abroad. Again this brings up the question of a liberal foreign-trade policy. If Congress gives us one to match the stabilization fund, the foreign currencies in the fund will help get us vastly expanded imports.

The technical difficulties before the conferees are admittedly many and complicated, the task of devising a formula for each nation's quota in the stabilization

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fund alone consuming much of the time of subcommittees in the first week of the conference. Some compromise reflecting rival plans based on a nation's gold holdings, a nation's foreign trade before the war and a nation's income will undoubtedly be blended out of the conflicting suggestions. The problem of determining what is the "proper" use of foreign exchange also challenged the talents of the respective delegations for international collaboration.

Despite the rising voice of criticism from the outside, there was an air of confidence at the meeting, mixed with a determination that the work of the delegates here shall not fail, whatever the respective parliaments and Congress do to kick these brave plans around with selfish and nationalistic trade programs and unilateral monetary policies. The instability of the postwar world will then be upon the heads of these legislators.

Both Harry White and representatives of the OWI have been doing an excellent job of public relations at the conference, aware that this thing is of first importance to every working stiff, farmer and business man in America. White, in his afternoon seminars, works up the enthusiasm of a professor, and frequently shakes his finger with the ejaculation, "That's a very intelligent question. I'm glad it was asked," etc., and then is off in high speed in a dissertation on the economic facts of international life.

The OWI has a crew of six people from the overseas branch, reporting the conference and its aspirations to the peoples of Europe and Asia daily. Delegates from each of the participating nations make four-minute recordings which are rushed to New York or San Francisco for insertion in regular broadcasts beamed to the outer world daily by the OWI. Full coverage is reported by the OWI newsmen, and passed on through 1,800 newscasts a week to foreign lands and to 55 outpost offices in the remotest corners of the globe. The tenor of all this public-relations work is that real international collaboration is taking place here at Bretton Woods, that the subject matter of these conferences—steady trade, steady markets and full employment—is as real to the little people of the earth as tonight's supper. It is to be devoutly hoped that our Congress agrees.

Bretton Woods, N. H. EDWIN A. LAHEY

How Britain Finances the War

THE MANNER IN WHICH today's total war is financed is by no means a purely financial matter, an affair of experts or of financial specialists; it is rather a vital cornerstone of the country's entire economic and social policy. The way in which Britain is financing the war is an essential factor in strengthening and preserving her social stability. In contrast to imperial Germany, Britain even in the First World War raised a considerable portion of her war expenditures through taxation. And since Britain's state finances remained sound even during the period between the two world wars, since British government loans, taken up in World War I, always paid interest, the government creditors—that is, essentially the British middle classes—were not disappointed in their confidence in the state. In Germany, on the other hand, the war expenditures of World War I were raised merely by loans. At that time taxes were not even enough to cover ordinary expenditures. That is why Germany, after having lost the war, had 150 billion marks' worth of war debts. In Germany inflation did not start after the war, but during the war itself. As a result, the German middle classes lost their property, and their economic disintegration was one of the decisive factors in the rise of National Socialism.

It is not easy to find one's way through the jungle of statistics on Britain's income during the war, her war expenditures, consumption, etc. When one learns, for example, that Sir Kingsley Wood, the late Chancellor of the Exchequer, introduced a budget of £5,756 million,[1] which is £30 million higher than Britain's entire net income in 1940—which ran to £5,726 million—then one despairs of ever gaining a clear picture of British war finances. For how are the British supposed to have accomplished the miracle of using their entire annual income for state expenditures, while they still have to eat, live and clothe themselves?

To find a measuring rod comparable to the British state expenditures, it is not enough to base our calculations on the net national income alone; one must add indirect taxes to this net national income to reach the income at market price. Furthermore, Britain, in a dual sense, has been living off her substance during the war years. On the one hand she liquidated part of her invested capital abroad, and on the other hand she did not fully replace her capital at home (the fact that in 1942 the loss of capital invested abroad was smaller than in 1941 is due to the effects of American Lend-Lease).

Altogether Britain had at her disposal in the war years of 1940 to 1943: £7,341 million; £8,703 million; £9,519 million, and £10,236 million. How is this total available sum distributed between government expenditures and the consumption of the people?

1 Figures in this article were taken from official British sources, especially "The Budget White Paper, an Analysis of the Sources of War Finance and Estimates of the National Income and Expenditure in the years 1938 to 1943," and from numerous articles that appeared in The Economist (London).

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By and large, one can say that in 1940, 1941 and 1942, more than 50 percent, and in 1943 nearly 50 percent, of Britain's income was used for personal expenditures on consumption and the remainder for government expenditures. The breakdown of British consumption is interesting in this connection. Nearly 50 percent of it was taken up by food, drink and tobacco; less than 25 percent by rent, water, fuel, light and household goods; clothing accounted for another 10 percent.

In Britain a large percentage of state expenditure—it is larger than in the United States—is covered by taxation. In the year 1942, out of an expenditure of £5,110 million, £2,344 million, or 46 percent, were covered by taxes. In the year 1943 a still larger percentage—£2,876 million out of £5,782 million—was covered by taxes.

This analysis, however, has not taken into account the fact that the value of the pound sterling has declined, even though, surprisingly enough, Britain carried out such a successful fight against inflation that the devaluation of the pound in 1943 was much less than in previous years. The Economist estimates that compared to prewar times the English pound lost 35 percent of its value in 1943 as compared with 30 percent in 1942, 25 percent in 1941 and 15 percent in 1940. If one presents the pound devaluation of the British national income during the war and its distribution according to the purchasing power of 1938 on this basis, one comes to the following conclusion:

(In millions of pounds of 1938 purchasing power)

	1938	1940	1941	1942	1943
Consumption	4,138	3,640	3,390	3,350	3,270
Government expenditure	837	2,660	3,365	3,530	3,840
Maintenance and increase of domestic capital	645	390	230	200	160
Overseas disinvestment	−55	−655	−638	−490	−485
Gross national product	5,565	6,035	6,347	6,590	6,785

These statistics give us a starting point from which to answer the question which stands in the center of war financing: *How did Britain arm for war from the production angle?* How did she bring it about that government expenditures rose from £837 million in 1938 to £3,840 million in 1943, thus claiming more than half of all goods produced in 1943? It is generally thought that this growing war-material production in Britain was made possible chiefly by a decline in consumption by the population. The British figures show clearly that the real picture is fundamentally different. *It was primarily increased production which made the vastly expanded war-material production possible.* More than two-fifths of the additional war expenditures were made possible by the growth in production; the *reduced* consumption contributed less than 25 percent. The remainder was raised by losses in capital and by sales of some British investments in the United States. In this manner Britain received goods and services from America for which she did not have to export goods and services on the same scale. She also suffered losses of capital at home, losses that were not fully replaced.

It seems noteworthy to me that Britain was able to cover no less than two-fifths of her growing war expenditures by raising her production. This was possible, although her production was at times gravely impaired by German air attacks and the overwhelming majority of her productive male population was under arms.

Thus the war gave a clear demonstration to the British people of how, before the war, the British economy was impeded in the full exploitation of its production, by both unemployment and monopolies. For if a considerable increase in production was possible during the war, then it would naturally be possible on an even larger scale once air war and blockade were things of the past, and when the millions who are today under arms can again be absorbed by production.

Only to a comparatively small degree have the British people paid for increased war-material production with a decline in consumption. And, what is even more important for the social stability of the country—the decline in consumption has affected the various social strata rather evenly. Primarily this is due to the British tax system. We have shown that half of the state expenditures are being financed by taxation; here it should be added that in the last year almost two-thirds of the taxes were made up out of direct taxes, *i. e.*, income tax, surtax, estate duties, national-defense contributions and excess-profits taxes. Even in World War I nearly half of all taxes were direct ones. Their share has since increased.

Before the First World War direct taxation in Britain ran to 47.8 percent; in the period between the two world wars it rose to over 55 percent; for 1943-44 it amounts to 63.1 percent, or nearly two-thirds of all taxes. That, in turn, means that the well-to-do in Britain are being called upon more and more for the financing of the war, and that, furthermore—and this is vital for social stability—the decline in consumption which is inevitable in wartime, is distributed fairly evenly. Despite the 50-percent provision of funds through taxation, Britain's indebtedness is, of course, constantly growing. But the rate of interest is today far below that of World War I; it is even below that prevailing in the years before World War II.

Britain's debt today is already twice what it was in 1938-39; the increase in interest of the British debt has, however, risen to a much lesser extent because the rate of interest was sharply reduced. In addition it should be realized that a 35-percent devaluation of the purchasing power of the pound has set in. In the years 1940-41 to 1942-43 the payment of interest on British

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indebtedness increased by about £100 million. In 1943-44 the interest amounted to nearly £365 million and is increasing by more than £50 million every year. By the end of the war the interest will probably amount to from £400 to £450 million. While that is a large sum, the British state, which has a budget of £5,782 million for the duration of the war, will have no insurmountable difficulty in raising the £400 million of interest for its entire national debt.

Britain is placing an extremely heavy burden on her ruling class. With this kind of finance and with her method of rationing many goods, Britain has almost entirely stopped further inflation; at the same time she has organized her war economy in such a way that the decline in consumption affects the upper and middle classes as sharply as the working class. In this war Britain has lost a considerable portion of her foreign capital, and she will feel after the war a further loss of income abroad which came from shipping. She will have to readjust her production in order to remain in the lead industrially. Many symptoms indicate that after this war, too, Britain can prevent large-scale inflation, so that the British middle classes—primarily the ones who buy government bonds—will again be able to preserve a considerable part of their property. That is possible only by the manner of war financing applied in Britain, and it is noteworthy that it was a British Tory, the late Sir Kingsley Wood, who carried out this financial program which far more than that in any other of the belligerent countries affects the propertied classes.

It seems to me that part of the explanation for this lies in the fact that the British Tories, a class which has had a great deal of experience in power politics, is willing to undergo sacrifices in this war—heavy sacrifices at that—in order to create stable social conditions at home and to raise as little opposition as possible to the conduct of an imperialist foreign policy after the war. The British Tories know that in the wake of this war an imperialist policy in India, for example, will undoubtedly be more difficult to put over than ever before. If there were sharper inflationary tendencies in Britain itself, and if social antagonisms were aggravated there, such a foreign policy would be well-nigh impossible. That explains why Sir Kingsley Wood, a Tory, introduced a budget and carried out the financing of the war almost unopposed even by the Labor Party.

FRITZ STERNBERG

What Is Japanese Strategy Today?

ALTHOUGH JAPAN'S TURN has not come yet, the handwriting can be read on the wall. Not the ancient "Mene mene tekel upharsin," but a more modern text: "Cherbourg Saipan Minsk B-29." To the Japanese leaders from Tojo down, it must be clear after the invasion of Normandy and the Marianas that the United Nations have the power to crush the Nazis this year and to deal effectively with Tokyo thereafter. But Japan's generals and admirals can still look toward one ray of hope, namely, that something will intervene to prevent us from applying our power with the full military effectiveness inherent in it. And they can, accordingly, follow a strategy of making the cost of our victories as high as possible and at the same time seek to encourage new illusions that peace is possible with a Japan that has not been thoroughly defeated. Above all, they must prolong the war, for every extra week or month of hostilities means additional time for the appearance of unexpected factors which they hope might produce a compromise peace.

In territorial terms, Japan must be thinking more and more of her inner empire—Korea, Manchuria, Formosa and perhaps a sphere of influence in north China. The mandated islands of the Pacific and the post-Pearl Harbor conquests in Southeast Asia have in all likelihood been written off, especially since they are clearly in the process of being lost. But if Japan can retain her nearby bases on the continent and in the adjoining waters, she will possess springboards for future aggression and have at her disposal the iron, coal, steel, shale oil and other resources on whose development she has lavished so much attention. For in the present economy of Japan the inner empire, despite its shortcomings, is worth more than the far less developed areas of the Indies, Philippines, Burma, Malaya, Indo-China and Thailand.

The inner empire is also a key to Japanese politics, since its retention—especially Manchuria—would enable the defeated warlords to tell the Japanese people that the war had not been entirely in vain. Whether the Japanese nation would accept this argument we do not know. But the line of reasoning is crucial for the militarists because it offers them the only possibility of survival. It is their alternative to the Cairo Declaration in which the United States, Britain and China pledged themselves to strip Japan of all her territorial loot.

The Japanese leaders are doing more than hoping, for they are not without strong cards in their hands. Their navy, although weakened, is still very much in existence and is not underestimated by the United States fleet. Their army is also quite strong, for it has been matched against forces of equal strength only on limited fronts in India, Burma and the Pacific islands. Nowhere have Japan's soldiers had to go through the ordeal faced by the Germans, the ordeal

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of fighting day after day against hundreds of thousands of well equipped, highly trained troops.

It is true that China's seven-year-old struggle has been a heavy drain on the Japanese, but China's isolation from her allies, combined with her military, economic and political weaknesses, prevent her from being more than a harassing factor at present. It is also true that the United States hopes to reinvigorate the China front by landing air and ground forces on the coast. Yet it must be recognized that in recent months the Japanese have been concentrating on the destruction of China's powers of resistance, partly to frustrate or impede American plans for a coastal invasion.

The first step in Japan's counter-strategy was the invasion of India in March, with the objective, among others, of cutting the river and rail communications between Calcutta and the northeastern airfields from which materials are flown into China. If successful, the India drive would have dealt the Chinese an enormous psychological and material blow by depriving them of their only important foreign supply route. Chungking would have been plunged into conditions reminiscent of the darkest days of isolation after the cutting of the Burma Road early in 1942.

While this unsuccessful Indian overture was still being played, the curtain was raised on a new Japanese campaign in north China, with the scene later shifting to central China and the south. The results were serious. Enemy forces took two leading centers, Loyang and Changsha, seized a large portion of the Peiping-Hankow-Canton railway, the only line traversing China from north to south, and captured the airfield at Hengyang. One of China's leading military experts, Lieutenant-General Liu Wei-chang, declared in the army newspaper, Sao Tang Pao: "China's only hope now is an Allied victory."

Since this despairing statement was made, the Chinese have registered a comeback, lifting the siege of Hengyang and driving the Japanese into retreat from their most advanced positions along the southern portion of the Hankow-Canton line. But there is no evidence as yet that these results, achieved in an area close to the centers of Allied air power in China, are forerunners of a general Japanese retreat. Nor can we be certain at present that the withdrawal of this spearhead of Japanese penetration in the south is more than temporary or that it will not be followed by new enemy offensives elsewhere on the long front.

The inevitable minimum result of the enemy drives will be to impede air operations against Japanese positions in China, Japanese shipping in Chinese rivers and coastal waters, and the Japanese homeland itself. That our B-29's have hit Japan again is cheering, but it does not mean that our air facilities in China are undamaged or the links between advanced and rear bases entirely unbroken. Another inevitable effect will be the further weakening of China's economy and war effort, since recaptured cities and villages are likely to become areas of famine in the future. Moreover, to the extent that the Japanese retain newly won sections of China's railways, their own communications will be improved and they will be able to loosen the economic and political ties between Chungking and the parts of free China near the coast.

These unfavorable factors must be stressed because there is a tendency in this country to laugh off Japan's activities in China every time a campaign ends in some kind of Japanese retreat. We are inclined to overlook the damage caused by the Japanese before the retreat began because we neglect one cardinal fact: that Japan's object in China is not to seize territory for its own sake, but to destroy China's powers of resistance. What this means to the United States is clear when we realize that, for all her weaknesses, China is still our only important land front against Japan.

It is theoretically possible, of course, that the United States might be able to defeat Japan by invading her directly from island bases to the south, north and east, without bothering to land in China. But if the public statements of Admiral Nimitz are any indication, this strategy does not appeal to those Americans who possess the most intimate knowledge of our own strength, the power of the enemy and the difficulties of the operation. As seen at the present moment, nothing could be more hazardous—if not impossible—than to fight the decisive battles of the war from slender, inadequate bases, for example, in the Philippines and Formosa. In China the United States has a front that is already in existence, a front on which it may be possible to defeat Japan without undertaking the risks of an invasion of the Japanese homeland. At the same time, action in China and landings in Japan are not mutually exclusive, for an invasion of Japan, should it later be found necessary, would take place under the most favorable conditions if the bulk of the Japanese armies had first been seriously weakened on the China front, if masses of China-based bombers had helped to soften Japanese industry, and if we could approach Japan from the continent as well as other directions.

This article has emphasized the degree of initiative Japan still possesses, the hopes Japan's leaders may cherish and the problems faced by the United Nations, in order to indicate that, while unexpected good fortune may come our way, we have no reason to count on an easy victory. Yet it is also becoming increasingly obvious that Japan's position is difficult in the extreme. The enemy's ships are being sunk at an increasingly rapid rate; his outer defenses are crumbling on the road to the Philippines and Japan itself; his overextended communications with the southern empire are in danger of being cut in the not-too-distant future;

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his leading industrial centers face the certain prospect of large-scale bombings; and he must be grimly aware that the United States and Britain will be able to throw thousands of ships, planes and men into the Far Eastern war when Germany is through. He also knows that the possibility of conflict with Russa cannot be ruled out and that the Russians, short of war, may render their allies valuable aid.

Everything that Japan counted on at Pearl Harbor is vanishing. The disunity of the great powers, the complacency and unpreparedness of the United States and the success of German operations in the west were some of the factors—apart from her own power—to which Japan looked for victory. Today the Big Four, whatever their differences, stand together; the United States, whatever complacency it may retain, is fighting hard and effectively; and Germany, whatever her remaining strength, is a battered shield which will not long protect Japan from the full wrath of her foes. At the same time, as long as the decisive battles in the Pacific lie ahead, Japan can pick up some crumbs of hope.

Most of the things the United Nations can do to disappoint the Japanese are obvious. But it is worth stressing that the earliest possible defeat of Germany is a major prerequisite to shortening and simplifying the Far Eastern conflict. Politically it is also essential that the United Nations exact stern justice in dealing with Germany. For the Japanese will be watching to see whether a nation can do what Germany has done and escape retribution. If it becomes clear that there is some hope in a speedy peace, but that the continuance of war can only bring heavier punishment, decent elements may be encouraged to press for peace, and the indecent may lose heart.

But, whether or not the Japanese can be encouraged to quit short of outright defeat, we face even more immediate problems in China where, as Vice President Wallace has recently indicated, the political situation requires swift improvement and relations with Russia need to be cemented. At present China is divided not only by the lines the Japanese have drawn through her territory, but also by the barriers Chungking has erected between itself and the guerrilla areas in the northwest. To maintain her spirit in the present crisis and prepare for the ultimate counter-offensive, China will have to subordinate these differences to the larger needs of the war. Closely linked is the question of relations with Russia, since it is no secret that many members of the Chungking government are anti-Russian as well as anti-Communist, and that Moscow is disturbed both by their domestic attitudes and their foreign policy. On these broad questions there is little doubt that the United States and Moscow see eye to eye, for it is in the interests of China's allies—as well as China itself—that all military energies be used entirely against the enemy.

This situation throws light on a leading fact about the war in Asia, namely that, just as Japan's past advances resulted largely from our weaknesses and errors, so any hopes Japan may entertain of avoiding unconditional surrender can be realized only if the United Nations commit enormous blunders. The responsibility for the earliest possible conclusion to the war in Asia rests on Allied shoulders and nowhere else.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

What to Do with Germany

II. *How Long and What Kind of Occupation?*

How long should the occupation last? By what steps can a national government emerge from it?

If a genuine democratic revolution should prosper, there would be no need for an occupation at all: the AMG, at least, would be superfluous, even if some strategic points were held. The revolutionary government would itself undo the past and deal with the Nazis more effectively than we can do. That we ourselves should derive a brief emotional satisfaction from an occupation is not a good reason for insisting on it. But failing a successful revolution, it will be unavoidable. If we manage it as well as we did in the Cologne region after the last war, it will leave no bitter memories behind it: on the contrary, it may do good. But in 1918 it was conducted not by bankers in uniform but by soldiers: nor was there any need to destroy the existing local administration. But the longer it lasts, the less salutary will be its effects. It is obvious that the withdrawal of a considerable army of men from productive work will delay our own recovery. There will be work enough for every keen soldier in the Far East. What the Germans can pay would be better spent in repairing the ruin they have caused in Russia than in maintaining an idle army of occupation. It is, moreover, obvious that as long as we refuse responsibility and freedom of movement to the Germans they cannot recover the use of their atrophied faculties. They can reëducate themselves only by activity. All this is on the assumption that the occupation works well. A thousand officers, of whom many spoke no word of German until the other day and never saw Germany, will now take it upon

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themselves to govern her. Is government such an easy art?

So soon as there is a provisional government in sight which can run a civilized administration and carry out the work of self-determination with honesty and good sense, the occupation should cease. When the first period of chaos and danger is over, it should suffice to hold the chief strategical keys—railway junctions, air fields and arsenals. A mobile force should be available, some of it air-borne, capable of rapid action where it may be needed.

Some may argue that Germany must be occupied for an indefinite time, in order to enforce obedience to the peace settlement. Will it be so unreasonable, then, that only force can maintain it? This school of thought forgets that the victors will still have in their hands a monopoly of sea and air power. They could at choice reduce a recalcitrant Germany—slowly by blockade, promptly by bombing her cities. Would she be much more helpless if she were occupied forever?

We have to consider how in a country deprived of all social cohesion a provisional government can be erected out of nothing. It is doubtful whether there are among the exiles many capable of strong leadership, though there are many who could do good educational work and some who understand organization. Exiles of Jewish origin should not seek conspicuous positions, until they can be freely elected. The key to this difficulty may be found by starting at the bottom in the many provincial cities. Germany was, before the Nazis came to power, much less centralized than England and France. She had an active tradition of municipal life, and the government of her cities was enlightened and progressive even under the Empire. If the problem is to find men whom their fellow citizens will respect, it will be easier to discover them in their own home towns than on the national stage. Let us suppose that municipal councils have been constituted, in the way suggested, and that they have worked well for two or three months. The next obvious step is to form provincial councils in each *Gau* by election from the town and rural district councils. After another short interval, it would be easy to summon a National Council, composed of representatives chosen by the provincial councils. Let it sit for a time in a consultative capacity dealing with questions submitted to it by the military authority, to which in turn it might address memoranda or resolutions. From the first some executive power should be transferred to it, for example over education. It is the proper body to nominate the executive heads of the various ministries under the military administration. A commission, which it appoints, works out meanwhile a draft for the new Constitution. No less important than the Constitution will be its economic plan governing the whole work of reconstruction.

Finally, a cabinet responsible to it should be chosen on a coalition basis, to act as a provisional national government and preside over the election of a constituent assembly. Before the peace terms assume anything like their final shape, the spokesmen of the National Council should be invited to discuss the draft settlement with representatives of the United Nations. How rapidly this gradual delegation of authority can proceed will depend in part on the ability of the groups and parties in process of formation to work together. But much also will depend on the character of the peace the United Nations intend to impose. If it is punitive in conception, or if the Germans are left too long in doubt, it is vain to expect from them either much readiness to collaborate with the victors or that mood of resolution and hope in which alone men build boldly and well.

It should be understood that anything this first national government does can only be provisional. The final decision of all the bigger organic questions on which the future of Germany turns must fall to a directly elected assembly, which can do useful work only after a period devoted to the free discussion of known facts and clearly thought-out plans. That it will meet in a creative and revolutionary mood is the best hope we can entertain.

It may be well to make rather more explicit assumptions on which these suggestions for the transition are based. There are, broadly, only two possible ways of proceeding, if no revolutionary government has established itself before the German armies capitulate. The victorious Allies, the Russians in the East and the Anglo-Americans in the West, can at a moment of their own choosing nominate Germans to whom they will entrust the administration under their supervision. That means, for a time at least, the breaking of Germany in two. The alternative plan is to allow Germans to choose their own provisional government—a single administration for the whole Reich.

The objections to the former course are overwhelming. Even if the Allies were to discover the best men available—a task of immense difficulty—would these men ever succeed in winning the confidence and loyalty of their fellow countrymen? They might be, in fact, honest and patriotic citizens, but they would look like quislings. Their authority would rest on foreign bayonets and on nothing more. And there is another danger. Let us suppose that we do succeed in finding men of high character and enlightened opinions willing to serve under us. The result might well be that when the occupation ended, not only these individuals but the groups and parties to which they belonged would be hopelessly discredited. The task of collaborating with the conquerors cannot be welcome to any normally constituted German citizen. It is better, therefore, that it should be laid upon him as a duty by his fellows. They know, as we cannot, whom they can trust and respect. Only if the spokesmen are freely chosen, albeit by rough and ready methods, will their advice be of much use to us, or to the Russians.

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There are, to be sure, those who take a contrary view. Germans, they tell us, are a peculiarly docile people, who are happy only when they are regimented. If we govern them firmly, of course with good intentions, and tell them plainly what they must do, they will obey with perfect submission and even with servility. The generalization that Germans are peculiarly docile may mislead us. They have on occasion resisted their own most powerful and popular leaders with success. Bismarck was twice defeated by the steady and unyielding resistance of two big bodies of Germans—the Catholics in the *Kulturkampf*, and the workers in their struggle against the exceptional laws directed against the Social Democrats.

It may be true that Germans do accept discipline rather more readily than we should, when their own native rulers require it of them for the good of the nation. It does not follow that they will be equally obedient to foreign rulers, or to quislings. They assumed that a Bismarck and even a Hitler had in view only the interests of the German people. They may not attribute to us the same intentions. They may think that our chief purpose is to weaken them—as in the matter of military strength it is. They may even suspect that we are influenced by commercial rivalry. To the Russians they will attribute the motive of revenge. When the French occupied the Ruhr, their reply was the most formidable essay in passive resistance that history records. If the occupation is prolonged, as some influential experts propose, for 25 to 30 years, we must reckon on bitter resistance, not all of it passive. German nationalists are addicted to murder.

There is another argument against a prolonged occupation which deserves at least equal weight. It is, presumably, the purpose of all of us, whether we are Conservatives or Socialists, to promote in Germany the establishment of a truly civilized government, which will renounce a warlike policy and collaborate with its neighbors for the good of Europe. The instant that any government of that character emerges, whatever its political color may be, we should, if we act logically, promote its popularity and success by every reasonable means. If it is to thrive and win the loyalty of the German people, it must be respected, abroad and at home. The fate of the Weimar Republic should be a warning here. We allowed it no successes, however modest. We cold-shouldered it in every possible way. We paid it none of the courtesies customary between friendly powers. I think it is a literally correct statement that during its fourteen years of life no member of a British Cabinet ever paid an official visit to Germany. When Hitler rose to power he was visited first by Mr. Eden and Sir John Simon, and then by Mr. Chamberlain. These things are not trifles, nor are the Germans the only people who are sensitive to them.

If we sincerely wish that a pacific form of democracy shall take root in Germany, it would be folly to impose on it the penalties of humiliations which the Nazis have so richly deserved. The only rational course is to promote its prestige and its popularity by treating it with respect. There lurks no peril in this prescription. Germany after this war will be so near to total ruin that nothing is to be feared from her power for ten or twenty years to come. On grounds of safety there is no need for a prolonged occupation. The danger, invisible yet predictable, lurks in the mass-mind of this nation which cannot work healthily in fetters.

The feeding of the German population in a period of political confusion, with the transport system in chaos, will raise complicated technical problems. Last time there was a German government; but between the armistice and the signature of peace, it was still subject to our blockade. Our army in the Rhineland, unable to endure the sight of the misery round it, raised its voice in protest. Only then, after five months' delay, did the first foodships arrive. This time the whole responsibility and most of the work of organization will fall on the United Nations.

We assume that the feeding of Europe will be treated as a single problem: that all the supplies and stores of food available on the Continent and all the means of transport will be pooled. If, as is possible, Germany still has reserves, looted from her victims, these will be made generally available, a principle which should apply also to her rolling stock, motor and air transport, ships and barges, also in part looted.

The food we control and import must be distributed impartially over the whole Continent in accordance with the physiological needs of its inhabitants. Our survey may and doubtless will reveal the fact that the needs of the Germans are less urgent than those of most of their victims. The Greeks and Belgians in particular have been more gravely undernourished and for a longer period than the Germans. That establishes for them in the timing and measuring of our supplies a prior claim. Our task is to feed the whole of war-stricken Europe back into health. Neither vengeance, partisanship nor fear should bias our scales as we measure out the rations of the helpless or subject peoples committed to our charge. It is necessary to say this with emphasis, because after the last war Mr. Hoover's relief organization used food on a great scale as a means of political pressure against "the Reds" and boasted that it had done so. To use starvation as "an instrument of policy" is as barbarous as the use of war for that purpose. A plain appeal to morality should suffice, but I will reinforce it with another. A people suffering from prolonged undernourishment becomes mentally and morally abnormal. A nation in a subnormal physical condition is apt to choose leaders even more neurotic than the average citizen.

H. N. BRAILSFORD

This is the second of three articles. The third will appear in an early issue. — THE EDITORS

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Washington Notes

Will Wallace Be Sacrificed?

AT THIS WRITING, no one, with the possible exception of the President, knows who the Democratic vice-presidential nominee will be. Opposition within the party to Wallace is considerable, and it is rumored that FDR may sacrifice him on the altar of expediency. Wallace cannot be renominated without the President's support.

Nearly everyone in Washington is involved in the vice-presidential fight, with members of the President's inner family taking an active part in furthering some candidate. Many names are mentioned as alternatives. They include Under Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius Jr., a native of Chicago and now a citizen of Virginia; Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn; James F. Byrnes, the "assistant President," who wants it mightily; Senator Alben W. Barkley of Kentucky, Senator Harry S. Truman of Missouri, Mr. Justice William O. Douglas, Ambassador John G. Winant and others. Robert E. Hannegan, chairman of the Democratic National Committee and a fellow Missourian, has tried to sell Senator Truman, and is still working for him, but will take almost anyone rather than Wallace. Tommy Corcoran has tried to sell Mr. Justice Douglas, and is said to have enlisted cabinet support. Barkley, Byrnes and Rayburn have considerable Southern and congressional backing. Sentiment, however, has not crystallized behind any of the alternatives; nearly all of their supporters are part of the stop-Wallace movement.

One fact not generally reported in the newspapers is that Mr. Wallace has considerable delegate strength. Like Mr. Willkie, he probably has more popular than political support, yet the Vice President will go to the convention with approximately 300 delegates actively for him. He would have to get almost that many again to be nominated; at least half of that number will go to him without any help from the President. But it is conceded that Wallace cannot win unless the President endorses him. Virtually all the conservative forces in the party are opposed to Wallace. If he is sacrificed they will have won a victory.

If the President sacrifices his 1940 running mate it will be a cynical act; it will be an act that will make many persons wonder whether, as far as domestic policies are concerned, it really makes much difference what happens in November. James Loeb's excellent letter to Mr. Willkie in this issue of The New Republic is in general unassailable. He is right that the country's only hope lies in a Democratic victory this fall, yet it must be admitted that even assuming such a victory, it is not a very substantial hope. In the last few months neither party has shown much conception of the enormous problems before us. For foreign-policy reasons alone, it would seem that the Democrats must be reëlected. Yet all the President's fine phrases are generalities. His actions speak differently.

Of course, as the letter to Willkie says, you have to choose. And certainly the Democrats, and the forces supporting them, are infinitely preferable to the Republicans, and the forces supporting them. Yet I wonder if it is entirely advisable for independents to give the Preside their unqualified support now. I don't know what his pea plans are, and I am suspicious of them because I kno something about the action he has taken in Italy ar France. I know that he is supporting the most reactiona group in the War Production Board. I know that he trea the people lightly at his press conferences, withholding vit information and refusing to discuss matters about whi Americans have a right to his opinions. His advisers say th his silence has been good politics. Even if it is, I don't lil it. Before I give my vote to the President I want him come out in the open and explain many things. He ow as much to the American people.

After all that pessimism, there is room for optimisn and there is reason for it in the subcommittee appointed l Chairman Hannegan to do the spadework on the Dem cratic platform. The subcommittee will go to work befo the convention begins. After the convention meets it wi become the nucleus of the permanent Resolutions Con mittee, but the most important work will be done by th subcommittee prior to the convention. The subcommitte appointed is a good one. There is no bid to the ant New Dealers in its membership. Among the members a Representatives John W. McCormack of Massachuset (chairman), Ed V. Izac of California and Thomas D'Ale andro Jr. of Maryland; Senators Wagner, Hatch, O'Ma honey, Truman, Pepper, Green and Tunnell; Joseph Daniels of North Carolina and George J. Burke of Mich gan. Not a Connally, George, Byrd, Bailey, O'Danie Tydings, McCarran, Cox or Smith on it!

The Truman Committee and the Murray Small Bus ness Committee of the Senate have issued strong state ments condemning the position of those in the Wa Production Board who will not go along with Donald M Nelson's proposals for a slow but orderly plan for recor version. Senator Truman put his finger on the oppositio to Nelson when he denounced "selfish business groups tha want to see their competitors kept idle until they finish the war contracts" and army and navy officials "who want t create a surplus of manpower with the hope that the conse quent pressure on unemployed workers would result i some of them shifting to occupations or areas in whic there is still a manpower shortage." It is a sad commentar on Nelson's authority that although he announced his re conversion plans before going to the hospital, the peopl who work for him have refused to issue the necessar orders—and the orders were approved before Nelson be came ill.

Notes: A few hours after the President praised Con gress for its new version of the price-control act, the OPA announced that under the law it would have to authoriz an upward revision of its ceilings on about one-third of th country's cotton goods. . . . There is hope that Rumani can be taken out of the war. . . . Washington militar officials are more optimistic than ever. One top officia who generally has been pessimistic says that Germany migh be beaten at any time, but he warns that she might hol on into 1945.

Washington T. R. B

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Home Sweet Home

DAVID O. SELZNICK's first movie production since "Gone with the Wind" runs on forever like most of his productions (the best of which, to my knowledge, is still his first, "King Kong"), is characteristically crammed with famous movie names from Shirley Temple to Lionel Barrymore, and is described in its foreword as being a story about that "indestructible fortress, the American Home, 1943." The title of the picture is "Since You Went Away" and the fortress in it belongs to the Hiltons, who are a pretty, pie-faced mother (Claudette Colbert), her two pretty, pie-faced daughters, aged 17 (Jennifer Jones) and 13 (Shirley Temple), and their father, who is away at war during all of the film but is seen almost as often as they are—as Neil Hamilton, in the several hundred photographs they have of him around the house. The authors, Margaret Buell Wilder and Mr. Selznick, paw over his family's wartime existence with an idolizing belief and love that should satisfy even the devotion of the husband.

"Since You Went Away" holds religiously to a philosophy consisting in the ideas that only happy, virtuous or funny things happen in the American home, that only the pretty and the brave live there, that any complications should be more than balanced by happy rewards. This is symbolically expressed in the ending, on Christmas Eve, when the mother receives word that her husband, who has been reported missing, is safe and returning home. I suspect that the daughter's fiancé (Robert Walker) was unconsciously made less handsome and less heroic to soften the effect of his really being killed.

In the hands of anyone as scrupulously conscientious about showing *the* American home as Selznick is in this picture the material things that make it up are interestingly accurate. He is finicky enough about almost any object that would go into middle-class life, from the kind of chenille spread you would find on the parents' bed to the kind of sprinkler that would be on the front lawn: but he is fiendishly finicky about mementoes—there are as many of these as there are conceivable places to put them, and among the bronzed baby shoes, the pottery knickknacks, the newspaper clippings, are some more strikingly accurate perceptions, like the kind of poem the husband would write in the kind of handwriting he would have, and the kind of leather family album he would paste it in. These details are good up to the point where their placement in the scene, the amount of wear and tear on them or the way the camera looks at them, are supposed to reveal the nature of the Hiltons' lives. At that point everything turns up either store fresh or, if worn and used, still photographed, posed and lighted to look new and gets the same negative quality pawnshop objects take on when they have been cleaned up and divorced from their old environment.

This denatured realism shows up with an even stranger effect in the story and the uses Selznick makes of it. He has a commendable desire to show all sides of the war on the home front, even the less agreeable. But of all scenes he might have picked in a rehabilitation hospital where wounded men are being taught to use their artificial limbs, he chooses that of the patients being given ice-cream cones —which would have been a neat irony if it hadn't been figured just as a pretty thing to be going on at the moment. In another scene the irony is intended, but again muffled and practically negated: a banker on a delayed train complains of how much the delay is costing him; the soldier next to him holds up the stub of an arm and says he doesn't mind it, he has plenty of time—and then the whole thing is wreathed in the soldier's beatific smile and contentment. There are a number of tours taken through civilian centers like railroad stations and cocktail bars where bits of conversation are caught on the sound track, but cuteness comprises about three-quarters of these fragments of talk.

As a whole, the picture is as doughy and inconsequential as the bread you get in grocery stores, partly for the above reasons and also because of the cautious, narrow level that the people are held at. The older daughter's adolescent agonies are made much of, but only in the form of a cute distress, Joseph Cotten's interest in her, which is supposed to be that of an eternal rake, and ought to cause some poignant sexual difficulties in the girl, remains at a vapid level to preserve the less awkward elements in his personality, the event itself and the general graceful tone of the whole picture. For its length, this is as ineffectual a movie as I ever saw. MANNY FARBER

The Bandwagon

Pfc. Dorothy L. LeRoy, a former New York model from Birmingham, Alabama, now with the Medical Corps, makes it almost pleasant to lose a leg or an arm. She is at Walter Reed Hospital, interviewing returning casualties and putting their service records aright. – *Story under a picture of Miss LeRoy which was captioned "Makes a Wound Worth While," in The Washington Post.*

BE A JR. COMMANDO . . . AT PAGE! Where little boys, 6 to 14, develop sturdy bodies and happy hearts (in the most advanced Commando style). Military drill, swimming pool, large asphalted, newly equipped playground (with the latest Jr. Commando equipment). Horseback riding. Vigilant instructors. School if desired. – *An advertisement in The Los Angeles Times.*

Mr. [Ernest] Bevin at one point asked permission of the Speaker [of the House of Commons] to call Mr. [Aneurin] Bevan a liar, but this was denied. – *From The New York Times.*

What About Fala?

In a thunder-clap voice that needed no microphone [Gerald L. K.] Smith denounced Franklin D. Roosevelt, Eleanor Roosevelt, Colonel Jimmy Roosevelt, Colonel Elliott Roosevelt, Sistie Dall, Buzzie Dall . . . Harry Hopkins. . . . – *From The Louisville Courier-Journal.*

On the Home Front

I noticed in New York the other day that there is no longer a dearth of red meat in the smart hotels and restaurants. In the Colony Restaurant, most fashionable of luncheon spots, nearly every woman I saw was eating either filet mignons or minute steaks. – *Evelyn Peyton Gordon in The Washington Daily News.*

Our readers are invited to contribute to this column; $1 will be paid for each item used. Address Bandwagon, care of The New Republic. Please enclose the original clipping. – THE EDITORS

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Correspondence

For an Over-All Housing Program

SIR: With interest and approval I read the special supplement entitled "A Congress to Win the War and the Peace" [The New Republic, May 8]. It is a timely program and one to which the progressive thought of the country will subscribe.

There is, however, one conspicuous omission from the program to win the peace, namely an over-all housing program, private for those families who can afford it and public for those who cannot pay more than an economic rent. May I write this item for the Manifesto?

If the United States builds 1,250,000 new dwellings per year for ten years following the war, America will practically overtake the constantly increasing need for shelter and almost wipe out the slums. Such a program would incidentally contribute heavily to a high rate of most useful employment and national income. With legitimate public assistance in financing, but no direct or tax subsidies, except to reduce the cost of overvalued inner-city land, private enterprise can perform the greater part of the task. There is at present no evidence that private enterprise will do much more than in the past; the National Association of Real Estate Boards has just declared that it foresees only about 300,000 new houses a year.

And yet the NAREB and its echo, the National Association of Home Builders, spend time and much money trying to kill public housing for those whom they cannot possibly serve, namely, families with incomes too low to pay non-profit rents. Any platform for winning the peace must include public housing. It is financed mainly by private capital and can be wholly financed by it; it is designed by privately practising architects and engineers; it is built by private contractors and privately employed labor; it is constructed with privately manufactured materials; and it is operated with equipment and supplies furnished by private vendors. Only to private renting agents and to unscrupulous real-estate speculators does it not pay a profit. To widows and children and the underpaid it supplies homes of simple American decency and sanitary standards. It costs the taxpayer no more than the slums.

BRYN J. HOVDE, President,
National Public Housing Conferences, Inc.

Pittsburgh, Pa.

Soldiers Will Make the Future

SIR: Soon, millions of words will be flung over the country, purporting to be what the soldiers want, what they think, what they fight for. . . . The truth about soldier opinion is, I'm afraid, rather appalling. A few soldiers, say 10 percent, have some ideas. Of that 10 percent, about seven percent want to get rid of "niggers, yids and labor unions." The other three percent are very wobbly. The remaining 90 percent have no opinions, no interest, no knowledge. They fight well, because working and playing hard, to win, is a national trait, if there is such a thing.

It's totally dishonest and unscientific to think these men are coming back to settle into the old quiet routine of movies, sweethearts and electric refrigerators. . . . What one time might have been a passive, perhaps harmless ignorance, is turning to active hatred—but not against Hitler, or oppression. These men will fight Hitler, but become little Hitlers in doing it, if fostered, or left in their present ignorance. . . . The hardships and horrors of war are not going to bring them back steaming with tolerance, brotherhood of man, and love. The last word has a strange, obsolete sound.

We must face, and keep facing, the fact of soldiers' social immaturity. It will be one of the most powerful and dangerous forces in our postwar society, Clare Boothe Luce and the bleached bones of her "G. I. Jim" notwithstanding.

S/SGT. W. H.

The Coos Bay Story

SIR: Re: the Coos Bay and anti-strikers'-collection story, we of the navy would like to know what caused the crew to take up such a collection. Who was the commanding officer; what is his past record; were any officers involved in the "voluntary" aspect of the collection; if so, what is their past record both in the service and in civilian life? There are many other questions that can be asked. The recent release by the navy, indicating that the funds collected would be returned to the crew of the Coos Bay, sounded as if appropriate "official" action would be taken. What the results of "official" action will be leads only to interesting speculation.

We regard this as the most important story since the invasion, since it previews a phase of contemporary socio-economic friction.

R. S., S. K. 1/C., United States Navy

Medicine and the Profit Motive

SIR: An important fact about the practice of medicine which Senator Murray did not mention in his recent article ("Medical Care for All Americans," July 10) is that advances in the science and practice of medicine and surgery have all been accomplished without appealing to the profit motive. When a doctor discovers a new cure or treatment for a disease or a safer way to perform a difficult operation, he does not patent it and charge a license fee for using it. He publishes it free in the medical journals for all to read and all who are competent to use. Yet the advance of science applied to medicine has at least kept pace with the advance of science applied to industry, where the profit motive rules.

Also the best hospitals are not the small proprietary profit-seeking ones, but either government or charitable institutions. Thus the profit motive appears to be unimportant as a lever for social progress or as a motive for providing satisfaction for important social needs.

ALFRED BAKER LEWIS

New York City

From The New Republic Mail Bag

Warren H. Stewart, president of the Minnesota State Teachers College Board, writes in regard to Howard Y. Williams' article on "Harold Stassen: Fake Liberal" (The New Republic, June 5). Mr. Stewart denies a statement in the article to the effect that Dr. Charles R. Sattgast, former president of the Bemidji State Teachers' College, and Mr. George A. Selke, former president of the St. Cloud State Teachers' College, "resigned" their respective positions because of political pressure. Both Dr. Sattgast and Mr. Selke are serving in the armed forces on temporary leaves of absence, Mr. Stewart maintains, and no politics was involved in their departure.

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Books in Review

Capitalism's New Friend

MR. BROWDER'S BOOK [1] is well named, for the blessed word "Teheran" appears on almost every page and in a dozen piquant combinations. We have "the concord of Teheran," "the program of Teheran" and "the guarantee of Teheran." We have "the heart of Teheran," "the spirit of Teheran" and "the Teheran perspective." Moreover, when he says Teheran, he means it: "For my part, I take the Declaration of Teheran at its face value. I reject the cynical evaluation of Teheran, whether it comes from Willkie or anyone else. And in every voice which raises doubts as to the validity of Teheran I hear an echo of Hitler's speech!" "Teheran," says the book's last sentence, "showed us our path in war and peace. We must learn how to travel that path, without deviations, to its glorious end."

There has been talk that Communists, in both the USSR and the USA, have abandoned Marxism. What Communists have abandoned, Mr. Browder explains, taking cognizance of the charges, are "old policies and formulas used by Marxists in the past for different historical situations." According to him, "Marxism is today, for America, first of all a guide to victory in the war." Since only the spirit of Teheran can win the war, it follows that the gospel of Teheran is the only bona-fide Marxism. There is in the book not a single quotation from Marx, Engels or Lenin, none of whom was present—even in spirit—at Teheran.

Applying this new and flexible Marxism, Mr. Browder ambitiously surveys a wide territory. Yet his discussion of Europe after the war is curiously cautious. He says nothing about what should be done with Germany, nothing about any Balkan country except Yugoslavia, and very little about any of the western European nations. On the other hand, it is quite clear to him that the Czecho-Slovak Government-in-Exile is good and the Polish Government-in-Exile bad. It is also clear to him that the whole European capitalist economy must be reconstructed and can be reconstructed in ways profitable to American business.

In Asia he takes a bolder line. Naturally he favors the exerting of pressure on the Kuomintang to advance the interests of the Chinese Communists. But he goes beyond that, offering what seems to be a revolutionary proposal—the emancipation of all colonies in Asia. He hastens to point out, however, that emancipation will create a greatly enlarged market for American goods and will therefore be to the advantage of American capitalists. It will not, he grants, be to the advantage of British capitalists, who want to retain the colonies because they are afraid of American competition, but that problem can be solved by an agreement between the two nations that will guarantee British interests a fair share of Asiatic—and African—business. He would also have agreements to prevent conflict between British and American business men in Latin America.

[1] Teheran: Our Path in War and Peace, by Earl Browder. New York: International Publishers. 128 pages. $1.50.

What this means seems to be clear. Mr. Browder sees a world dominated by three great powers—Russia, England and the United States. Russia is to have a free hand in eastern Europe and a stake in Asia. England and the United States are to be allowed to exploit Asia, Africa and South America. In the Anglo-American alliance the United States is to be the senior partner, but there is to be no unseemly talk about liquidating the British Empire, and British capitalists are to be guaranteed profits enough to keep them quiet. As for the Soviet Union, it will be assured a dominant position in world politics, and it will have a chance to develop its own resources without fear of outside interference.

Mr. Browder does not shrink from the implications of his thesis. In November, 1939, though admitting the political backwardness of the working class, he called America "the country which is the most ripe, the most prepared, for a quick transition to socialism." At that time, in fact, he felt that Roosevelt and the interventionists were seeking to involve us in an imperialist war in order to prevent the emergence of socialism in both Europe and America. Now socialism in the United States appears to him to be so remote that it is not worth thinking about. All that now matters to Mr. Browder is postwar unity, and certainly talk about socialism is not the way to achieve that. On the contrary, good Communists, bowing to the inevitable, should be prepared to work with the capitalists. They should, for instance, use their influence in the trade unions to obtain the agreements between business and labor that Eric Johnston has suggested. They should even go so far as to talk about "free enterprise," though of course they know that what "free enterprise" means is "the freedom of capital to concentrate and centralize itself in ever larger units." Mr. Browder has begun to catch the very accents of the members of the National Association of Manufacturers: he is against trust-busting but he favors the protection of small business.

The party line has changed so often, and Mr. Browder has so dutifully changed with it, that it is not easy to be seriously concerned with anything he says. Certainly the new line has been adopted with all the usual farcical extravagances, and certainly the only fixed point of reference is still the Soviet Union. If Russia's foreign policy changes, Browder's ideas will change too. But, quite apart from the resolute official optimism, there is, I think, a new kind of confidence in this book, as if Browder believed that the line might stay fixed for some time to come. And there is a chance that it may.

If I am right, Browder has seen from his own angle a vision that has dazzled Americans in many walks of life. With the three great powers linked together to preserve order, the backward portions of the globe could be rapidly industrialized, and the problem of what to do with the output of our heavy industries could be temporarily solved. In the resultant prosperity the standard of living could be expected to rise. Meanwhile, colonial revolts would be nipped in the bud by nominal emancipation, while order would be

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maintained in the newborn nations by a combination of the techniques of capitalist economic imperialism and Soviet puppet governments. Mr. Browder clearly envisages a greater and greater extension of government power in the United States and Great Britain, and doubtless he foresees the emergence of more and more totalitarian qualities. (He shakes his head sadly over the necessity of holding an election while the war is on.) In all probability he assumes that, after these preliminary stages, the socialist millennium will arrive, but I doubt if he wastes much time thinking about it.

Mr. Browder's vision awakens no enthusiasm in my breast. He tries to demonstrate that there is no opposition between his hopes and those of Eric Johnston, and I am sure he is right. What I am looking for is an effective opposition to both of them. Until it appears, I agree with Arthur Koestler that pessimism is obligatory.

GRANVILLE HICKS

Three Exotics

The Land of Prester John: A Chronicle of Portuguese Exploration, by Elaine Sanceau. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 243 pages. $2.75.
Cardinal of Spain: The Life and Strange Career of Alberoni, by Simon Harcourt-Smith. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 282 pages. $3.50.
Anna and the King of Siam, by Margaret Landon. New York: The John Day Company. 391 pages. $3.75.

INVITED TO GIVE a long-considered judgment, one would say that the loveliest book of 1943 was Mr. Maurice Collis' "The Land of the Great Image," the first of a series called the Byways of History. The second of that series is "The Land of Prester John," and, in this wretched season of so many quite fraudulent books, it is one that will earn a hearty shout of recognition. It possesses such abundant life and fresh morning vigor that having read it one feels like inviting in all one's friends for conversation. And beyond its freshness, it is a book of history that, in presenting its time, place and action richly, transcends its time and gives one a strong sensation of all time and all action. Yet there is nothing in the least pretentious about this beautifully spaced narrative, and there is not the smallest effort to draw lessons or trace analogies.

What a story! Throughout the Middle Ages the Christian courts of Europe were constantly haunted by the legend of the existence in Asia of a great Christian realm, ruled over by the priest-king, Prester John, mightier than any Western prince. Successive Portuguese monarchs, then engaged in building their fantastic empire in India and the Far East, desired to conclude a treaty with Prester John, in order to destroy Islam and all its people. (Albuquerque, Governor of Portuguese Asia, asked Lisbon for engineers to divert the Nile into the Red Sea and so to destroy all the Kingdom of Cairo!) And when the legendary monarch turned out to be the Lion of Judah, Lisbon sent ambassadors to follow lost or imprisoned ambassadors, to dare the terrible Red Sea risks, the Moslem exterminators of the African littoral, or the imbecile stupidities of Portugal's own governor-epigones.

The atmosphere and the concrete telling apart, there are two other virtues the book possesses. Whether one asks of a byways-book or any sort of history book that it make plain the symmetry of events or that by its sensitive dalliance it delight one with curious treasures, "The Land of Prester John" will satisfy. In the central march of its story it resembles an immemorial mountain track that inevitably traces the surest route. From that track many thin paths go out, to ascend outlying peaks or obtain glimpses of the deserts and plains; yet they never lose sight of the main valley and never fail to return before long. By such a path one witnesses the sufferings of a returning Jesuit taken prisoner into the Arabian Hadramaut of the early sixteenth century. By a finer thread one arrives at a point where one is left thinking for minutes after the path comes to an end on the mountain slope. The priest Francisco Alvares, reaching the Emperor, at last found his forerunner Pero da Covilham, so many years a prisoner-guest in Abyssinia. Pero served as Father Alvares' guide and mentor. In the heart of those tremendous cordilleras of Africa he led the priest to where a deep gorge cut the mountains. A torrent hurling itself from dizzy heights into the dark abyss filled the air around with spray like snow. Pero de Covilham pointed through the water mist to a cavern's mouth far down the rocky wall. "A monk lives there who passes for a saint," he said. Still farther down the chasm another cave was dimly visible. "There," said Father Francisco's guide, "a mysterious white man has done penance for twenty years." Three centuries later the poet Rimbaud, having extinguished the poetry in his mind, was to smuggle arms into this realm—but what spent poet or remorseful sinner was this, living in the thunder of doom?

The book is rich in delightful or impressive instances. Nor is it without humor. Though of the Christian faith, the Ethiopians saw little harm in polygamy. Their church "was vague on the subject" and repeated marriages had their their advantages, one of them being that a marriage exempted the husband from a month's fast. "Some of my friends," Padre Francisco wrote, "used to marry new wives on the Thursday before Lent, merely to have the privilege of eating meat." But then, the Coptic discipline was so ferocious that the Moslem marauders always chose the Lenten fast for their incursions, the Abyssinians then being too weak to put up much of a fight, unless by a judicious balance of appetites the Copt was able to keep himself in trim for battle. "Marry, eat and survive!"

The large outlines are in the book. In the second period, of glorious alliance, a tiny band of Portuguese soldiers—idealists—defeated the fanatic thousands of the Crescent and restored the Negus to his throne. It was an exploit that compared more than favorably with those of Cortes, who had not to face Turkish cannon and arquebus and weapons of steel, as the Portuguese did. And the Lusitanian feats are much fairer to contemplate, for the murderous materialism which went hand in hand with religious idealism in Mexico was absent here. It is not a case of difference between nations, for elsewhere the Portuguese were just as rapacious as the Spaniards. But here they were fighting to restore freedom to a Christian people, so that when King Galawdewos gathered up all the gold and silver of his churches and all the jewels of his womenfolk to reward the few survivors, they refused to accept payment of any sort and went away with no recompense, but merit in heaven

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and a raft of slaughtered Moslems in hell. There is something for the materialist historian to think about in that. And quite as much for the idealist, too.

How sad is the sequel! Between the morning and the midday of this adventure the Portuguese monarchs had moved all Rome to get the Inquisition established in Portugal. In 1541 a humanist intellectual published a book on the faith, religion and customs of the Ethiopians, the materials of which were derived from the Abyssiniain ambassador to Portugal. His book was found worthy by theologians, and though the author of the present work omits the interesting fact, it was dedicated to Pope Paul III. The book was condemned, which was bad. But worse; it had always been known that the Coptic church was schismatical; it was now revealed that it was heretical. The result was a Jesuit mission and theological division within the Abyssinian realm, civil war and ghastly bloodshed. Had not the emperor turned away from his new Roman allegiance the realm would not have endured until the next Roman invasion. Islam would surely have swept it away. However, the king listened to his best advisers before it was too late and, expelling the Portuguese, severed all contact with Europe.

"Cardinal of Spain" is also one of this Byways of History series. If it resembles a byway less than a garden path, a path through a pretentious formal garden of French design, that is the fault of the epoch and its temper. Eighteenth-century Spain is, on the whole, a matter for specialists. Its highways have no tragic cordilleras and no lake-filled valleys; its byways are not bird-haunted and the crosses beside them are in cheap Italian stucco.

What is to be observed in Spanish culture on the whole was true in politics. It was not a noble period. Cardinal Alberoni, the subject of the book under review, was the the son of an Italian gardener who became virtually the absolute ruler of Spain. In reality that rise is not very singular in Spain of the Doldrums. Without lifting one's pen from paper one can think of an Italian castrato singer who did the same, of a fraudulent nun who came near it and a palace cook who quite brought off the same trick by becoming the queen's lover.

It would seem that Mr. Harcourt-Smith, aware of the dullness of the epoch, has determined to make compensation in his style. At its soberest it is effective and lively, and at its worst, which is quite often, intolerably pustular. It is a pleasant conceit to say, of the Venice of those days, that its churches, "so many seashells, echoed not with the sound of the ocean, but with the strains of amorous fiddles." But the author too often writes in the manner of the following quotation: "One beheld the last word in modern cities at Turin, broad avenues of decent palaces and the end of every vista a view of the encircling mountains inevitable as a latrine, or an old nurse's wisdom." On the whole the combination of sound narrative technique and excessive color suggests a Scotch plaid executed in cheap dyes.

The style is the least likable feature of what is nevertheless a remarkable book, "Anna and the King of Siam." The clumsy title might well serve as a sample of the style. Anna Leonowens, of whose work in Siam this is a retelling, wrote two books. Their manner, it is said, is unhelpful. One suspects that they have been too well absorbed by the present author, for there are noticeably two styles here. It is as if a rather obese novel of total recall had been imposed upon the more athletic skeleton of a good biography. In her anxiety to record Mrs. Leonowens' every reaction the author loses her sense of proportion and the story tends to clog with detail. The story, however, is magnificent and the book is 90-percent sheer relief in this desperate season. Anna Leonowens was an English governess who, in the 1860's, took employment at the royal court of Siam. She was very English and very much the governess and therefore strongly opposed to many customs of that unlovely court. As a consequence of her persistent efforts, some little good resulted.

As a record of a heroic life which one judges more heroic than that of the Portuguese pioneers in Abyssinia, the book is good; but it is as a picture of an oriental court that it must be read. It is altogether fascinating and indisputably authentic. The pretentious pomp, the ceremonies, the weird cruelties and the bizarre perversions of absolutism are here; its thoughtlessness, its grim triviality, its complicated rituals against bedevilment, its colossal inconsequence. By dint of skipping a little, one can remain absorbed in this story for hours at a stretch.

RALPH BATES

Out of England

The Captain's Wife, by Eiluned Lewis. New York: The Macmillan Company. 196 pages. $2.
Winter Quarters, by Pamela Hansford Johnson. New York: The Macmillan Company. 346 pages. $2.50.
Return of the Traveler, by Rex Warner. Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott Company. 208 pages. $2.
The Day Is Coming, by William Cameron. New York: The Macmillan Company. 573 pages. $3.
Man Goes Alone, by Neil M. Gunn. New York: George W. Stewart, Publisher, Inc. 255 pages. $2.50.

IN HER SECOND NOVEL about Wales, Miss Eiluned Lewis again demonstrates her ability to describe the activities and minds of children and to evoke Welsh atmosphere and coastal scenery. Unfortunately, her characters, the seagoing Captain Peters, his wife, their kith, kin and neighbors have little to distinguish them from one another. The only distinctive trait that redeems their blank anonymity is an ability to endure vicissitudes with a kind of tender stoicism. After a while, even her colorful children lose their individuality and turn into animated and uniformly likable balls of fluff.

It is a different kind of uniformity that tends to make the deft delineations of "Winter Quarters" harden and become brittle. Miss Johnson depicts the life of an English artillery battery during a lull between actions. She concentrates upon the less martial aspects of camp routine, the relations of the men to one another and to the little English village near which they are stationed.

A large and varied assortment of characters take equal prominence in the narrative. Miss Johnson makes the difficult attempt to reveal their interior lives, their pasts, their private circumstances in the present and the functioning of all three in the network of human relationships. A professional stylistic ease, adroit construction and vivacious,

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

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slangy dialogue further a readable recreation of an inte esting milieu.

Sex has, of course, been either deleted or diluted. somewhat synthetic harmony still pervades the batter despite the disruptions which the author strategically in troduces via a fascist lieutenant, a snobbish Tory and a ser sitive weakling. Her more typical soldiers and officers attai a certain verisimilitude largely through her judicious can cellation of the excesses of the war novels of the past—the have neither the illusions of the 1914 war hero nor th shattered illusions of the road back.

One could, however, wish for something of Miss John son's or even Miss Lewis' objective approach to an environ ment in the remaining three novels. These male novelis are, by comparison, monoptic and subjective, obstinatel refusing to stray far beyond the certainties of their ow experience. In all three, only as much of reality is conveye to the reader as can be refracted through the prism of single individual who is temperamentally or intellectuall akin to his author.

Rex Warner presents a symposium conducted by a dea soldier on the question, "Why was I killed?" The soldie is a casualty of the present war and his shade enters chapel through which a sight-seeing party is being con ducted. The priest is able to communicate with him an asks the question of the sightseers. The shade listens to th answers and is transported to witness scenes in the lives o these tourists which indicate the origin of their response The whole examination would be more pointed if, in stead of one, at least three questions were asked, namely "How did my death, historically, happen to occur? Ough I to have been killed? Did my death contribute to the im provement of the world?"

Mr. Warner rolls these questions into a single ambigu ous ball which can be and is bounced across the surface o contemporary English society without landing anywhere The inquiry is, however, conducted with a certain arduou sincerity and a perhaps excessive desire to be fair to every one that do eventually grind out some original insights.

"The Day Is Coming" is a long, uneven novel dealin with the life of one Arthur Cullen, who, at the age o fourteen, in the year 1887, joins the Socialist League led b the perennially underestimated William Morris. Shortl afterwards he becomes a skilled metal-worker in Morri colony. The colony dissolves completely in 1914 and th narrative suffers a loss in interest as the personages tha throng the earlier pages (Shaw, Wilde, Kropotkin, etc. disappear. Subsequently Cullen is returned to London an carried through the war, the dole, the general strike, throug dire poverty and relative comfort back to the site of th colony which has been rendered thoroughly ugly by "mod ernization." The principles of Morris' revolt against th profit-system and industrialism in favor of responsible an creative labor are maintained by Cullen throughout, i his struggle to keep himself intact against adversity.

Mr. Cameron makes it evident that these principle can inspire a significant criticism of society despite thei impotence to stem the industrial tide. Cullen's raging analyses of factories, London dwellings and even the com modities offered for sale in a modern department store are often extremely illuminating. However, the one cra

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that Cameron apparently has little respect for is the craft of writing novels. He is wordy, over-elaborate and unwilling to perform critical excisions on his material. Moreover, with a weakness that may well be rooted in the very theory of guild socialism, he treats human relations indifferently, as though all the problems of men and women were the insignificant byproducts of the way commodities are produced.

Unlike the other four novels which, by and large, pile up accretions of character in the vaults of general social knowledge, "Man Goes Alone" is an example of what has been called "conversion upwards," the effort to reincorporate abstract and general ideas into the psychic and emotional life of the individual. Like two other, classic, attempts at transvaluation, "Zarathustra" and "The Magic Mountain," it is allegorical in structure and employs a mountain to symbolize the aspiration of the spirit to freedom.

The result is an odd blend of subtle allegory and by no means unsophisticated ratiocination with an atmosphere of unworldly rustic simplicity. An old man, Tom Mathieson, is shown climbing a mountain in a lonely district of the Scottish highlands. The very first paragraph tells us that he is about to die, but the actual death is postponed to the last page, while he slowly ascends, observing the phenomena about him, meditating and recalling events of his past.

As a young man he had spent a two-year interlude in Glasgow during which he had come into contact with late nineteenth-century socialism and scientific skepticism. The rest of his life is passed in the pious rural community where it began, but the seeds of alienation have been planted. The mountain ascent is the conclusion of the reorientation process that ensues after a progressive estrangement from his environment results in near insanity.

Mr. Gunn is not masterful enough to do full justice to his crucial theme of the reconciliation of intellectual necessity with individual need. Although one does not feel that, as an author, he has assimilated the achievements of the modern novel, yet he has produced a sensitive exploration of the conflicts of personality in flux that have been the subject matter of the better modern English novelists.

WILLIAM POSTER

How to Win a Contest

The Winning Plans in the Pabst Postwar Employment Awards. Milwaukee: Pabst Brewing Company. 88 pages. Free.

WHEN the Pabst Brewing Company, in honor of its 100th anniversary, announced a $50,000 contest last December for the best postwar-employment plans, there were more than 35,000 entries. Recognizing that "postwar employment is one of the greatest problems which our country will have to face," the sponsors wanted to foster "individual American thinking on this vital subject." Contestants were required to present an original plan to stimulate full employment in our free-enterprise economy.

It was with considerable trepidation that a review of this pamphlet, which reprints the seventeen winning papers, was undertaken. After all, an unsuccessful contestant might very well be compared to the fabled fox. My own plan, I confess, failed to meet one of the conditions of the con-

CITIES OF LATIN AMERICA

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By FRANCIS VIOLICH

Reading this book is like talking to a friend on the train. Above all, it is human. Its purpose is to interpret the peoples and cultures of Latin America through their cities, for it is there that the character of any country is best revealed. Since urban architecture and planning is the author's profession, he is able to write with authority, as well as with sensitivity and discrimination, about the effect of the social and geographical background of the Latins on their urban development.

The author spent ten months visiting the localities which he describes, in the course of a survey sponsored by the City Planning Commission of San Francisco, to whom he is a consultant. He devotes his attention not only to the cities themselves but to the characteristics and manners of those who built and inhabit them. He freely discusses the "Yankee-imperialism" and "Colossus-of-the-North" bogies and the extent to which they have been canceled by the good-neighbor policy. He writes fluently, yet with a homely directness befitting his subject which, as in all good literature, is *people*.

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Written by a man who is not only one of the world's foremost architects but also a profound and original social philosopher, this book has stimulated nation-wide discussion of the social and economic problems involved in the future growth of American cities. It is indeed a classic presentation of these problems, and the solutions offered are certain to provide the basis for constructive urban development. Said Albert Guérard in *The Nation*: "I know of no single book on the subject so comprehensive, so free from crotchets and pedantries, so generous and yet so practical, as Eliel Saarinen's." The theme of this practical, yet philosophical study is "Organic decentralization." Henry C. Churchill comments in his review in *Survey Graphic* that "decentralization is inevitable, or perhaps dispersion is the better word. Saarinen makes evident the reason why and sets forth a method of controlling the process."

In short, THE CITY is a work of first importance to all students of contemporary thought, and is absolutely invaluable to the rapidly growing audience of those interested in city planning.

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test. As a variation of Mordecai Ezekiel's industrial-expansion idea it was not very original. Yet the munificent prizes were tempting; a thousand-dollar bond would be quite useful in the anticipated period of postwar unemployment. It is not too difficult, however, to attempt an uncolored appraisal of the winning essays.

The results of the contest are indeed flattering to economists. Of the seventeen prize-winners, fourteen are professional economists. Some of them enjoy high reputations and have made notable contributions. Among them are Mordecai Ezekiel, Joseph J. Spengler, John H. G. Pierson, Rolf Nugent and A. G. Hart. Yet most of the papers exhibit a shockingly timid mediocrity that will serve to confirm the layman's low opinion of economics. A careful survey of the essays' general quality showed six of them to be safely conservative while seven were mildly liberal. Four papers suggested middle-of-the-road schemes. Nine of the plans reprinted here offered multiple programs for the maintenance of postwar employment. The suggested devices included the gradual disposal of government war plants and surplus commodities, revision of our tax system, more vigorous anti-trust prosecutions, an expanded social-security set-up and the inevitable shelf of public works. The most comprehensive, and consequently one of the better, papers was that submitted by Mr. Ezekiel. Within the limit of 2,000 words, he drafted a well integrated, many-sided plan that was far superior to either of the two major winners. But aside from this entry, and that of Ross Stagner, the multiple schemes were vague and incomplete. Mr. Stagner, whose plan was probably the best of all, at least emphasized the cardinal precept of full employment: full production. Nor was he afraid to suggest that government plants be organized after the war on a semi-public basis to provide jobs for returning servicemen. But that, of course, is not free enterprise.

The remaining eight winners apparently believed that some single, striking device would be sufficient to give jobs to about 13 million people. Three writers quite seriously implied that full employment may be obtained only by a revision of the tax system. Now, no one denies that the American tax structure is top-heavy, inequitable and archaic. Yet completely revamping current taxation methods gives no guarantee that effective demand will keep pace with industrial output. The need for a high level of effective demand was amply stressed by Mr. Pierson. Space limitation, however, prevented him from developing his ideas as well as he has in his book, "Full Employment." One of the single-scheme plans, by Rolf Nugent, proved to be rather interesting. This essay, which had the virtues of originality and imagination, suggested the sale now of consumer durable goods for postwar delivery. The author argued that not only would inflationary pressure during wartime be lessened but physical production after the war would be [illegible]ured.

The two contemporary writers whose influence is most apparent in these papers are, of course, Alvin Hansen and John Maynard Keynes. Yet the fathers would barely recognize their offspring here. While the Keynes-Hansen doctrine clearly implies a mixed economy, or at least a modicum of government participation in economic affairs, the Pabst essayists either painfully avoided the question or clearly denied any advocacy of government activity. As the editorial in the May 29 issue of The New Republic said, "No more beautiful or seductive utopia was ever dreamed than . . . the suggestion that the type of business economy we now have would be capable of offering a job to every man and woman who wants one, simply by virtue of a few prohibitions and pats on the back."

The contest, it must be said, failed in its purpose. It did not succeed in bringing forth an original and practicable plan for full employment. Every idea discussed in the seventeen essays has been developed elsewhere and often in a more incisive and more readable manner. As your editorial said, they are "safe and undistinguished averages."

BEN B. SELIGMAN

Crime and Punishment

THE BOOK OF THE DEAD, by Elizabeth Daly (Farrar and Rinehart, $2). Miss Daly has been growing steadily in her mastery of the detective story: "Arrow Pointing Nowhere" was a superb job and her new one is at the same high level. This time Henry Gamadge, authority on old books, criminologist and remarkably pleasant character, unravels an intricate and absorbing case from clues provided by a couple of almost illegible pencilings in the margin of Elisha Crenshaw's copy of "The Tempest." Satisfaction guaranteed in spite of a rather fortuitous solution. E. H.

Contributors

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